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People assume that only the U.S. has class actions, and that assumption is
increasingly wrong. The existence of mass harms with large numbers of
claimants has created challenges for access to justice, judicial efficiency, and
the enforcement of legal norms that make traditional individual litigation
unworkable. Therefore, many European countries are struggling to craft
procedural mechanisms to allow the resolution of group claims in a way that
incorporates the helpful parts of U.S. class actions while avoiding its
inefficiencies and potential abuses.
This Article will discuss the current debate in Belgium. It begins, in part
I, by putting that debate in the European context and by describing the
current Belgian dilemma. Part II sets out three proposals for a Belgian class
action device, highlighting their common elements, as well as their
difficulties. Part III analyzes those proposals in light of class action theory
(class action goals, standing, funding and financing, remedies, and the role of
the courts), arguing that none of the proposals have been sufficiently thought
out and that each needs amendment or elaboration. Finally, part IV
concludes by putting the civil class action in the larger context of processes
for dealing with group harms and argues that a holistic approach is needed.
I. THE CURRENT SITUATION
A. European Background
In 2007, a prominent Dutch scholar wrote that resolving and
administering mass cases in Europe is a priority. “It is clear that resolving
mass cases must be prioritized, and that possible obstacles in the law must be
cleared out, even when they have their foundation in important principles. It
is clear that there is dynamism in this part of the law.”2
In the European orbit, however, this dynamism differs significantly.
Three categories can be discerned. First, some European countries have
class action-like tools. With the exception of Iceland, the European
frontrunners are the Scandinavian countries; Sweden, Norway, Denmark and
Finland.3 All of them have some sort of class action mechanism, although
there are substantial differences from the American-style class action,
particularly with respect to standing (with a preference for associations and
public actors as class representatives), and opt-in versus opt-out (with a
preference for opt-in).4 Despite their clear power, or maybe because of it,
2
Ton Hartlief, De twee werelden van massaschade, 41 NEDERLANDS JURISTENBLAD 2595
(2007).
3
STEFAAN VOET, EEN BELGISCHE VERTEGENWOORDIGENDE COLLECTIEVE RECHTSVORDERING
109–13 (2012).
4
Generally, American class actions are initiated by a member of the class. See FED. R. CIV.
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these class actions are rarely filed as lawsuits and primarily serve as big
sticks to encourage large corporations to avoid certain behaviors or to settle.
In 2007, the Finnish Consumer Ombudsman was given exclusive standing to
bring an opt-in class action.5 In 2009, the Finnish Consumer Agency
assessed that “the mere presence of the shadow of class action gives the
business sector an incentive for better legal compliance.”6 The same is true
in Denmark, where a public enforcer, the Danish Ombudsman, has exclusive
standing to bring an opt-out class action.7 The Ombudsman uses the tool as a
“nuclear bomb”8 to compel wrongdoers into a settlement that includes
behavior modification and restitution.
P. 23(a). Most Scandinavian countries, with the exception of Finland, also permit an individual
group member to initiate a class action. See Section 4 of the Swedish Group Proceedings Act of
2002, English translation available at http://www.regeringen.se/content/1/c6/02/77/67/bcbe1f4f.
pdf; Section 35-3(1)(a) of the Norwegian Dispute Act of 2005, English translation available at
http://www.ub.uio.no/ujur/ulovdata/lov-20050617-090-eng.pdf; Section 254(c) of the Danish
Administration of Justice Act of 1992. On the other hand, these jurisdictions also permit an
ideological plaintiff (e.g., an association or an ombudsman), see infra Part III.B.1, to start a class
action. See Sections 5 and 6 of the Swedish Group Proceedings Act; Sections 1-4 and 35-3(1)(b)
of the Norwegian Dispute Act; Section 254(c) of the Danish Administration of Justice Act;
Section 4 of the Finnish Act on Class Actions No. 444/2007, English translation available at
http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/2007/en20070444.pdf.
American damages class actions are opt-out class actions. See FED. R. CIV.
P. 23(c)(3)(B). Sweden and Finland have an exclusive opt-in system. See Section 14 of the
Swedish Group Proceedings Act and Section 8 of the Finnish Act on Class Actions No.
444/2007. In Norway and Denmark, opt-in is the default. See Section 35-6 of the Norwegian
Dispute Act and Section 254(e)(6) of the Danish Administration of Justice Act.
Exceptionally, the judge can impose an opt-out system in certain circumstances (e.g., in small
claims cases). See Section 35-7 of the Norwegian Dispute Act; Section 254(e)(8) of the
Danish Administration of Justice Act.
5
Act on Class Actions No. 444/2007, supra note 4; see also Petra Kiurunen, Finland, in
WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE
214 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012); Mikko Välimäki, Introducing Class Actions in Finland: An
Example of Lawmaking Without Economic Analysis (Dec. 13, 2007), available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1261623; Klaus Viitanen, Finland, 622 ANNALS AM.
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 209, 209 (2009). The complete version of this report is available at
http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Finland_National_Report.pdf.
6
Consumer Agency, The Threat of Class Action Has Improved the Consumer’s Position,
CURRENT ISSUES IN CONSUMER L. (Feb. 2009), http://www.kuluttajavirasto.fi/en-GB/050209_
eng/.
7
Danish Administration of Justice Act, supra note 4, Ch. 23(a); see also Trine Bogelund,
Introduction of Class Actions in Denmark, Young Lawyers’ Committee Newsletter (Int’l Bar
Ass’n), Sept. 2007, at 24, available at http://www.lett.dk/Files/Filer/PDF/Young_Lawyers_new
sletter_Sept_2007.pdf; Petra Kiurunen, Niklas Lindström & Michala Bylov Rath, Denmark, in
WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE
GLOBE 186 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012); Justits Ministeriet, New Rules on Class Actions
under Danish Law (Oct. 15, 2010), http://www.justitsministeriet.dk/fileadmin/downloads/rules.
pdf; Erik Werlauff, Class Actions in Denmark, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 202,
202 (2009).
8
A term the Danish Ombudsman (Mr. Henrik Øe) has used at various conferences.
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Second, various jurisdictions have created instruments (sometimes
experimental) to achieve collective redress. Three examples are worth
mentioning: England and Wales, Germany, and the Netherlands. Despite an
ineffective and inactive representative action procedure,9 England and Wales
have a Group Litigation Order procedure as a management tool to coordinate
the adjudication of individual procedures that give rise to common issues.10
In November 2008, the Civil Justice Council proposed to introduce an optout class action applicable in all areas of the law.11 The English Ministry of
Justice was reluctant, and believes that class actions should only be
considered in specific areas of the law, “only where there is evidence of
need, and [only] following an assessment of economic and other impacts and
consideration of alternative approaches.”12
The 2005 German Act on Model Case Proceedings in the Capital Markets
(KapMuG) established a model, or test case procedure, of which the core is
to detect common issues of law in a multitude of individual cases, have them
decided by a higher court, and resolve the previously suspended individual
cases taking into account the outcome of the test case.13 The KapMuG was
9
CIV. P.R. 19.6 (U.K.); see also ADRIAN ZUCKERMAN, ZUCKERMAN ON CIVIL PROCEDURE:
PRINCIPLES OF PRACTICE 509 (2d ed. 2006).
10
CIV. P.R. 19.10–.15 (U.K.); see also Neil Andrews, Multi-Party Proceedings in England:
Representative and Group Actions, 11 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 249, 258 (2001); Laurel
Harbour & John Evans, The United Kingdom, in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO GROUP
AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 169 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012);
CHRISTOPHER HODGES, MULTI-PARTY ACTIONS 3 (2001); Christopher Hodges, England and
Wales, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 105, 109–10 (2009). The complete version of
this report is available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Eng
land_Country%20Report.pdf; see also RACHAEL MULHERON, THE CLASS ACTION IN COMMON
LAW LEGAL SYSTEMS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 67–111 (2004) (describing the English
approach to group litigation).
11
CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL, IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTIONS:
DEVELOPING A MORE EFFICIENT AND EFFECTIVE PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTIVE ACTIONS 5 (John
Sorabji et al. eds., 2008), available at http://www.judiciary.gov.uk/JCO%2FDocuments%2FCJ
C%2FPublications%2FCJC+papers%2FCJC+Improving+Acccess+to+Justice+through+Collecti
ve+Actions.pdf; see also Laurel Harbour, John Evans, Erwan Poisson & Camille Fléchet,
Representative Actions and Proposed Reforms in The European Union, in WORLD CLASS
ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 156–59
(Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012) (discussing the proposed reforms in the UK).
12
MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO THE CIVIL JUSTICE COUNCIL’S
REPORT: ‘IMPROVING ACCESS TO JUSTICE THROUGH COLLECTIVE ACTIONS’ (2009), available at
http://www.lawcentres.org.uk/uploads/Government_Response_20th_July_2009.pdf; Christopher
Hodges, Response to Consultation on “Private Actions in Competition Law: A Consultation on
Options for Reform” (Centre for Socio-Legal Studies, Oxford University No. OX1 3UQ),
available at http://www.csls.ox.ac.uk/documents/1207ResponsetoUKBISonConsultationonCom
petitionPrivateActions.pdf.
13
Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetz [KapMuG] [Capital Markets Model Case Act], Oct.
2, 2011, ELEKTRONISCHER BUDESANZEIGER [eBAnz.] (Ger.). An English translation is available
at http://www.bmj.de/cln_102/SharedDocs/Downloads/DE/pdfs/KapMuG_english.html; see also
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an experimental act for five years. In 2012, the KapMuG was not only
extended to 2020, but the German legislature also modified the procedure.14
The most salient amendment, and one probably inspired by the Dutch
Collective Settlements Act, is the possibility for the court to approve a
settlement between the model claimant and the defendant that becomes
binding on all parties, unless they opt-out.
The 2005 Dutch Collective Settlements Act provides for settlement-only
An association or (special purpose) foundation,
class actions.15
representing the victims of a mass harm, tries to reach an all-embracing
settlement with the wrongdoer. This settlement is then approved by the
Amsterdam Court of Appeal, which has exclusive jurisdiction. Class
members who disapprove of the settlement can opt out. If not, they are
bound by the court decision approving the settlement.16 To date, six high

Moritz Bälz & Felix Blobel, Collective Litigation German Style: The Act on Model Proceedings
in Capital Market Disputes, in CONFLICT OF LAWS IN A GLOBALIZED WORLD 126, 135–38 (Eckart
Gottschalk et al. eds., 2007); Peter Gottwald, On the Extension of Collective legal Protection in
German, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 484, 492–94 (2007); Hans-W. Micklitz & Astrid Stadler, The
Development of Collective Legal Actions in Europe, Especially in German Civil Procedure, 17
EUR. BUS. L. REV. 1473, 1485–88 (2006); Luidger Röckrath, Germany, in WORLD CLASS
ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 241 (Paul G.
Karlsgodt ed., 2012); Michael Stürner, Model Case Proceedings in the Capital Markets:
Tentative Steps Towards Group Litigation in Germany, 26 CIV. JUST. Q. 250, 252–53 (2007).
14
Gesetz zur Reform des Kapitalanleger-Musterverfahrensgesetzes [KapMuG] [Capital
Markets Model Cast Act Amendment], Oct. 25, 2012, ELEKTRONISCHER BUNDESANZEIGER
[eBAnz.] (Ger.). A full text version of the act is available at http://dipbt.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/
17/101/1710160.pdf. For an analysis and suggestions for reform see Eberhard Feess & Axel
Halfmeier, The German Capital Markets Model Case Act (KapMuG): A European Role Model
for Increasing the Efficiency of Capital Markets? Analysis and Suggestions for Reform (Jan.
2012), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1684528.
15
See Jeroen Fleming & Jaap J. Kuster, The Netherlands, in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE
TO GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 286 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed.,
2012); Ruud Hermans & Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, International Class Action Settlements in
the Netherlands Since Converium, in THE INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE LEGAL GUIDE TO:
CLASS & GROUP ACTIONS 2012, at 5–9 (2011); Ianika Tzankova & Daan Lunsingh Scheurleer,
The Netherlands, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 149, 149 (2009) (“Under the [Dutch
Collective Settlements Act], parties that have agreed to settle a mass damage claim may request
the Amsterdam Court of Appeal to certify the settlement, as a result of which it becomes binding
on the group . . . unless they opt out.”). The complete version of this report is available at http://
globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/documents/Netherlands_National_Report.pdf.
Marie-José van der Heijden, Class Actions, in NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE EIGHTEENTH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 197, 197 (J.H.M. van Erp & P.W. Van Vliet
eds., 2010).
16
The procedure is described in Articles 7:900–:910 of the BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW]
[Dutch Civil Code] (Neth.) and Articles 1013–1018 of WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE
RECHTSVORDERING [Rv] [Dutch Judicial Code] (Neth.). An English translation of the Dutch
Civil Code is available at http://www.dutchcivillaw.com/civilcodebook077.htm and an
English translation of the Dutch Judicial Code is available at http://dutchcivillaw.com/legislati
on/civilprocedure033.htm.
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profile cases have been treated under this act.17 The most recent decision
of the Amsterdam Court of Appeal in Converium appears to have had an
impact on global securities class actions. In its November 2010 decision,
the court ruled, based on the EEX and EVEX Regulations,18 it had
international jurisdiction to approve the settlement for non-U.S. class
members, even though the class mainly consisted of non-Dutch class
members.19 In its final decision of January 2012, the court declared the
settlement binding on all class members.20 In a decision that surprised
many European commentators, the court demonstrated it had no problem
with the contingency fee arrangement for the American lawyers, which
involved up to 20% of the amount of the settlement.21 After the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. National Australia Bank, Ltd.
invalidated class actions brought in the U.S. on behalf of foreign class
members,22 Amsterdam is poised to become the settlement hub for claims
involving non-U.S. class members in mass securities cases.23

17

Hof – Amsterdam 17 januari 2012, JOR 2012, 51 m nt. BJ de Jong (Converium) (Neth.)
[hereinafter Converium II]; Hof –Amsterdam 15 juli 2009, JOR 325 m nt. Scholten en Van
Achterberg (In de zaak van Randstand Holding N.V.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Vedior]; Hof –
Amsterdam 29 mei 2009, JOR 2009, 195 m nt. AFJA Leitjen (Shell Petroleum/Dexia Bank
Nederland N.V.) (Neth.) [hereinafter Shell]; Hof – Amsterdam 29 april 2009, JOR 2009, 196
m nt. AFJA Leitjen (Neth.) [hereinafter Vie d’Or]; Hof – Amsterdam 25 januari 2007, JOR
2007, 71 m nt. AFJA Leitjen (Dexia Bank Nederland N.V./Stitching Platform Aandelenlease)
(Neth.) [hereinafter Dexia]; Hof – Amsterdam 1 juni 2006, NJ 2006, 461 m nt. (Bayer
AG/WXYZ) (Neth.) [hereinafter DES]. All decisions are available in Dutch at http://zoeken.
rechtspraak.nl/default.aspx. The DES case was a pharmaceutical product liability case. All
the other cases were securities cases.
18
Council Regulation 44/2001 Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of
Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, 2001 O.J. (L 12) (EC) [hereinafter EEX
Regulation]; Convention of Sept. 16, 1988 on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments
in Civil and Commercial Matters, Sept. 16, 1988, 1659 U.N.T.S. 13 [hereinafter EVEX
Convention].
19
Hof – Amsterdam 12 november 2010, JOR 2011, 46 M nt. J.S. Kortmann (Converium)
(Neth.) [hereinafter Converium I]. The Amsterdam Court of Appeals claimed jurisdiction
based on Articles 2.2, 6.1, and 5.1 of the EEX Regulation, supra note 18.
20
Converium II, supra note 17.
21
Contingency fees are strictly prohibited in Europe because they violate public order and
are incompatible with attorneys’ professional ethics. See infra Part III.C.2.
22
130 S. Ct. 2869 (U.S. 2010).
23
Jeroen Kortmann & Marieke Bredenoord-Spoek, The Netherlands: A ‘Hotspot for Class
Actions’?, 4 GLOBAL COMPETITION LITIG. REV. 13, 13 (2011); see also Tomas Arons &
William H. Van Boom, Beyond Tulips and Cheese: Exporting Mass Securities Claim
Settlements from the Netherlands, 21 EUR. BUS. L. REV. 857 (2010) (describing the potential
export value of the WCAM procedure); Bart Krans, The Dutch Class Action (Financial
Settlement) Act in an International Context: The Shell Case and the Converium Case, 31 CIV.
JUST. Q. 141–50 (2012) (noting the jurisdictional problems if other European countries do not
recognize the Amsterdam court’s decisions or reading of EEX regulations); HÉLÈNE VAN LITH,
THE DUTCH COLLECTIVE SETTLEMENTS ACT AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (2011).
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Third and finally, some European states have no adequate instruments to
tackle mass cases. Although in June 2012 the new French Minister of
Justice, Christiane Taubira, re-launched the idea of introducing class
actions,24 and in May 2013 a concrete proposal for a consumer class action
was presented to the Council of Ministers,25 France, for the moment, only
has a joint representative action for consumers and investors (action en
représentation conjointe).26 Its scope is very limited.27 Only national
nonprofit organizations representing consumers or investors have standing.28
Moreover, they work on an opt-in basis by soliciting for individual mandates.
This can only be done through newspapers and magazines, but not via TV or
radio.29
Belgium also belongs to this last category. Together with France, it is
one of the last Mohicans in the European collective redress orbit.30 As
discussed hereafter, this is caused by the Belgian Supreme Court’s rigorous
interpretation of the existing standing rules and the deficient instruments to
deal with mass cases.
B. Current Belgian Law
1. Rigorous Supreme Court Interpretation
Traditional Belgian requirements analogous to U.S. standing doctrine
prevent the initiation of class actions. The bottom line is that, according to
Belgian law and the Belgian Supreme Court, natural or legal persons have
standing only to initiate an action in which they defend an existing,

24
Valérie Brioux et al., Justice: Christiane Taubira Veut Autoriser les «Class Actions», Le
Parisien, June 22, 2012 (Fr.), available at http://www.leparisien.fr/faits-divers/christiane-taubira
-veut-autoriser-les-class-actions-22-06-2012-2060771.php; see also Harbour, Evans, Poisson &
Fléchet, supra note 11, at 159–67 (discussing the proposed reforms in France).
25
Chasseurs d’ambulaces, ECONOMIST, May 11, 2013, at 62.
26
Véronique Magnier, France, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 114, 116–18
(2009); Erwan Poisson & Camille Fléchet, France, in WORLD CLASS ACTIONS. A GUIDE TO
GROUP AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS AROUND THE GLOBE 323 (Paul G. Karlsgodt ed., 2012).
27
See Magnier, supra note 26, at 117 (concluding that the current rules on soliciting class
members “are not fitted for class actions initiated by lawyers and that many changes in ethics
and the law would need to occur before group litigation could exist in France”). The complete
version of this report is available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/sites/default/files/do
cuments/France_National_Report.pdf.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
See generally Piet Taelman & Stefaan Voet, Belgium and Collective Redress: The Last of
the European Mohicans, in THE BELGIAN REPORTS AT THE CONGRESS OF WASHINGTON OF THE
INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 305 (Eric Dirix & Yves-Henri Leleu eds.,
2011).
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immediate, personal, and direct interest.31 They can neither defend the
general (nor public) interest,32 nor the interests of persons in a similar
situation.
Any legal action in Belgium is subject to two preliminary legal
requirements. Article 17 of the Judicial Code states that an action will not be
admitted if the plaintiff lacks the required legal capacity.33 This is the
authority (the power), the basis of which allows an action to be initiated.
Article 17 also requires that a party desiring to bring an action before court
must show a legal interest.34 If the party is unable to show an interest, the
action will be inadmissible. The interest is any material or moral stimulus or
incentive why an action is initiated.35
Article 18 of the Judicial Code expands upon the notion of interest: when
the action is initiated, the interest must already exist and must be
immediate.36 There is one exception. An action will be admissible if it
prevents the infringement of a right that is seriously threatened. This is
called an actio ad futurum and permits a claim for declaratory relief.37 Case
law attaches a further condition to the interest prerequisite: it must be
personal and direct. The pivotal case in that respect is the November 19,
1982 Eikendael case of the Belgian Supreme Court.38 The Court stated that:
Unless the law states otherwise, an action initiated by a natural
or legal person is inadmissible if the plaintiff does not have a
personal and direct interest. A general interest (i.e., the interest
of a class of people) is no personal and direct interest. The
personal and direct interest of a legal person is only that which
31

See CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] arts. 17–18 (Belg.) and the
Eikendael doctrine discussed infra note 38.
32
See CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 138 (Belg.) (the public
prosecutor ensures the protection of the public interest).
33
Id. art. 17 ; see also GEORGES DE LEVAL, ÉLÉMENTS DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE 22 (2003)
(defining capacity as “le pouvoir en vertu duquel une personne exerce l’action en justice”);
ALBERT FETTWEIS, MANUEL DE PROCÉDURE CIVILE 48 (1985).
34
See DE LEVAL, supra note 33, at 15 (defining interest as “tout avantage, matériel ou
moral, effectif mais non théorique que le demandeur peut retirer de la demande au moment où
il la forme”); FETTWEIS, supra note 33, at 48.
35
JACQUES VAN COMPERNOLLE, LE DROIT D’ACTION EN JUSTICE DES GROUPEMENTS 383
(1972) (“L’utilité que présente pour celui qui agit la mesure qu’il sollicite.”).
36
CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 18, sec. 1.1 (Belg.).
37
DE LEVAL, supra note 33, at 21; CHARLES VAN REEPINGHEN, VERSLAG VAN DE
GERECHTELIJKE HERVORMING I 43 (1968).
38
Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Court of Cassation], Nov. 4, 1982, PAS. 1983, I, No. 338
(Belg.) [hereinafter Eikendael]; see also Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Court of Cassation], Oct.
25, 1985, PAS. 1986, I, No. 219 (Belg.); Cour de Cassation [Cass.][Court of Cassation], Oct.
16, 1991, PAS. 1992, I, No. 129 (Belg.); Court de Cassation [Cass][Court of Cassation], Sept.
19, 1996, PAS. 1996, I, No. 830 (Belg.) (rulings that confirmed the Eikendael judgment).
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affects her existence or material or moral goods, especially her
assets, honor and good name. The fact that a natural or legal
person pursues a goal, even a statutory one, does not imply that
she has a personal and direct interest.39
The Belgian Supreme Court could have allowed class actions through
case law. However, on the basis of this strict precedent, it is generally
acknowledged that collective and class actions are not admissible in Belgian
civil courts, unless the legislature allows it expressly.40
2. Dealing with Mass Harms Without Class Actions
In Belgium, there are currently four ways to deal with mass harms:
joinder of claims and claims in intervention, party representation, statutory
collective actions, and, in criminal cases, the piggyback technique. Belgian
law does not allow class actions for damages. This Article defines a class
action as a representative action in which one person or association
represents an unidentified class of people similarly situated, without them
having to intervene as parties, but that are bound by the outcome of the
procedure.
First, the Belgian Judicial Code and Civil Code contain some procedural
techniques that are traditionally used for multi-party actions.41 Joinder of
claims allows several claims between two or more parties to be filed
together (in one writ of summons or petition) when they are connected.42
Claims are connected when they should be tried together in order to
prevent contradictory decisions.43 The technique of claims in intervention
makes it possible for third parties to intervene in pending proceedings.44
The intervention can take place voluntarily (by way of petition)45 or
coercively (by way of writ of summons).46 In this context, and contrary to,
39

Eikendael, supra note 38. This translation is that of the author.
VOET, supra note 3, at 32, 36.
41
Piet Taelman & Emilie De Baere, New Trends in Standing and Res Judicata in Collective
Suits (Belgium), in THE XIIITH WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: THE BELGIAN AND
DUTCH REPORTS 6 (A.W. Jongbloed ed., 2008); Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 323–25.
42
CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 701 (Belg.). Article 701 of the
Judicial Code. A distinction is made between objective accumulation (a party formulates
different claims against another party in a single procedure), passive subjective accumulation
(a plaintiff acts against several defendants in a single procedure), and active subjective
accumulation (several plaintiffs act against one or several defendants in a single procedure).
See VOET, supra note 3, at 23.
43
CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 30 (Belg.).
44
Id. arts. 15–16, 811–814.
45
Id. art. 813, sec. 1.
46
Id. art. 813, sec. 2.
40
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for example, England and the U.S.,47 it has to be underlined that a Belgian
judge is not allowed to involve sua sponte parties in the proceedings.48
When the judge comes to the conclusion that there are victims similarly
situated to the plaintiff, he cannot instruct their intervention, nor can he ask
(or force) parties to do so, nor can he suspend the proceedings in that
respect.
Second, the most used technique to deal with mass harms is party
representation, which makes it possible for a natural or legal person (the
representative) to represent a group of individuals if he or she received an
explicit mandate from each individual member of the group.49 In such cases,
only the class members who gave a mandate will be represented in court and
considered a party to the proceedings. From a procedural point of view, the
technique implies that as a result of a dispute over a substantive right, the
holder of that right grants another (natural or legal) person the power to
initiate the action resulting from a violation of that substantive right. The
representative does not have to show a personal interest, but only show that
the represented persons have an existing, immediate, personal, and direct
interest.50
Third, the legislature has created limited statutory exceptions.51 In
implementing multiple European directives, the Belgian legislature created a
series of statutory collective actions.52 Collective actions are general interest
actions “in which the individuals whose interests are involved cannot be
identified because of the generality of the interest.” They are to be
distinguished from group actions “where some form of identification or
demarcation is still possible.”53
Belgian statutory collective actions have five common characteristics:54

47

CIV. P.R. 19.2(2) (U.K.); FED. R. CIV. P. 19 (only for an indispensable party).
CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 811 (Belg.); see also infra Part
III.E.2 (discussing the active role of the class action judge).
49
CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] arts. 1984–2010 (Belg.); Hubert Bocken & Bernadette
Demeulenare, The Defence of Collective Interests in Belgian Civil Procedure, in BELGIAN
REPORT AT THE II INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW 161 (1983); Matthias E.
Storme & Evelyn Terryn, Belgium, 622 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 95, 97 (2009).
The complete version of this report is available at http://globalclassactions.stanford.edu/conte
nt/belgium-report-class-actions.
50
Hubert Bocken, Schorsingsbevoegdheid milieuverenigingen, in PROCEDEREN IN NIEUW
BELGIË EN KOMEND EUROPA 134–35 (1991); VOET, supra note 3, at 26.
51
The first words of the Eikendael decision are: “Unless the law states otherwise.”
Eikendael, supra note 38.
52
For examples, see infra notes 59–64.
53
Arons & Van Boom, supra note 23, at 862.
54
VOET, supra note 3, at 44–46.
48
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(1) they are an exception to the standing rules in Articles 17
and 18 of the Judicial Code;55
(2) they implement European directives;56
(3) only private professional, inter-professional, or public
associations (or organizations) that satisfy certain legal
criteria (e.g., having legal personality for some years,
usually three), have standing to bring them;
(4) those associations or organizations can only institute an
injunctive action (i.e. the cessation of an illegal practice)
or a preventive action;57 and
(5) the cause of action must correspond (overlap) with the
statutory aim of the association or organization.
These types of collective actions exist with respect to consumer
protection, misleading advertising, unfair contract terms and long distance
agreements, the amicable recovery of consumer debts, the environment,
discrimination and racism, copyright, etc.58 Some examples:
–

–

55

The Act of March 24, 2003 on Essential Banking Services
gives standing to professional, inter-professional, and
consumer organizations that have legal personality, and
either are a member of the Council for Consumption or
have been approved by the Minister for Economic Affairs
to bring an injunctive action before the President of the
Commercial Court in order to stop any act or activity
prohibited by the Act;59
Pursuant to the Act of January 12, 1993 on the Collective
Action for the Protection of the Environment, certain
associations (i.e., non-profit organizations having legal

See supra Part I.B.1 (describing the significance of Articles 17 and 18).
For example, the 2002 Act on Cross Border Injunctions implements Directive 98/27/EC
on injunctions for the protection of consumers’ interests; the Belgian anti-discrimination acts
implement Directives 2000/43/EC on equal treatment between persons irrespective of racial or
ethnic origin, 2000/78/EC on equal treatment in employment and occupation, and
2004/113/EC on equal treatment between men and women in the access to and supply of
goods and services, etc. See VOET, supra note 3, at 44.
57
Christine Dalcq, Les actions “comme en référé,” in LE RÉFÉRÉ JUDICIAIRE 168–71
(Jacques Englebert & Hakim Boularbah eds., 2003); see also Pierre Ramquet & Valérie Jones,
Belgium, in SUMMARY PROCEEDINGS 49 (Marc Jobert ed., 2000) (discussing collective actions
with respect to consumer cases).
58
For a detailed overview of the areas of law subject to these types of collective action suits
see Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 319–22.
59
Loi instaurant un service bancaire de base [Essential Banking Act] of Mar. 24, 2003,
MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 15, 2003, 26402.
56
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personality for at least three years, having environmental
protection as their statutory aim, and that are able to
demonstrate they are active in protecting collective
environmental interests) can bring an injunctive action
before the President of the Court of First Instance to stop
any act or activity that violates environmental
regulations;60
Under the Act of July 30, 1981 tending to Penalize Racist
and Xenophobic Acts (Racism Act),61 the Act of May 10,
2007 on Discrimination of Women and Men (Gender
Act),62 and the Act of May 10, 2007 on Certain Forms of
Discrimination (General Non Discrimination Act),63 antidiscrimination associations64 have standing to initiate an
injunctive action to stop any discriminatory behavior.

The procedural provisions for these collective actions are scattered in
different statutes dedicated to substantive law. Several proposals have been
submitted to Parliament to consolidate them into one procedural statute. The
idea is to make a clean sweep and create one standardized legal ground, on
the basis of which associations or organizations that satisfy certain legal
criteria have standing to initiate a collective action to defend collective
interests, so long as the cause of action corresponds with their statutory aim.
The most recent proposal dates from July 14, 2011.65 To date, this and all
other similar proposals have not been enacted.66
60

Loi concernant un droit d’action en matiére de protection de l’environnement [Collective
Action for the Protection of the Environment Act] of Jan. 12, 1993, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.]
[Official Gazette of Belgium], Feb. 19, 1993, 3769, available at http://environnement.walloni
e.be/legis/general/acenv001.htm.
61
Loi tendant á réprimer certains actes inspires par le racisme ou la xénophobie [Racism
Act] of July 30, 1981, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug. 8, 1981,
9928.
62
Loi tendant á lutter contre la discrimination entre les femmes et les homes [Gender Act]
of May 10, 2007, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 30, 2007, 2d
ed., 29031.
63
Loi tendant à lutter contre certaines formes de discrimination [General Non
Discrimination Act] of May 10, 2007, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium],
May 30, 2007, 2d ed., 29016.
64
These include any organization that has legal personality for at least three years and has
the protection of human rights or opposition to discrimination as its statutory aim. Some of
these organizations include the Centre for the Equality of Chances and Opposition to Racism,
the Institute for the Equality of Women and Men, representative employees’ and employers’
organizations, and institutions of public utility.
65
Chambre des représentants de Belgique, Proposition de Loi modifiant le Code judiciaire
en vue d’accorder aux associations le droit d’introduire une action d’intérêt collectif
[Proposal to Amend the Judicial Code to Allow Collective Actions for Associations], 2e
Session de la 53e legislature, Doc. 1680/001, July 14, 2011, available at http://www.dekame
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Fourth and finally, there is the piggyback, or partie civile, technique for
crime victims. In most common law systems, the victim is absent in a
criminal trial. He or she can, and in most cases will, be called as a witness
but is not a formal party to the criminal proceedings. The victim cannot
claim his or her damages during the criminal trial, and may do so only in a
separate civil case.67 In Belgium and other European countries, such as
France, this is different.68 The victim is a formal party to the criminal
proceedings, just as the Public Prosecutor and the defendant are formal
parties. There is no jury. In most cases victims will bring their civil claims
during the criminal proceedings.69 After the criminal judge has dealt with
r.be/FLWB/PDF/53/1680/53K1680001.pdf.
66
Unlike in Belgium, this unification process was successfully done in the Netherlands,
which have similar statutory collective actions. In 1994 under the influence of the Dutch
Supreme Court’s jurisprudence, all these actions were abolished and replaced by one uniform
provision.
1. A foundation or association with full legal capacity that, according to its
articles of association, seeks to protect specific interests may bring to court a
legal claim that intends to protect similar interests of other persons. 2. A
legal person filing a claim referred to in paragraph 1 is inadmissible if he, in
the given circumstances, has made insufficient attempts to reach a settlement
over the claim through consultations with the defendant. A period of two
weeks after the defendant has received a request for such consultations,
indicating what is claimed, shall in any event be sufficient to this end. 3. A
legal claim referred to in paragraph 1 may be brought to court in order to
force the defendant to disclose the judicial decision to the public, in a way as
set by court and at the cost of the persons as pointed out by the court. It
cannot be filed in order to obtain compensatory damages. 4. A legal action
referred to in paragraph 1 cannot be based on specific behaviour as far as the
person who is harmed by this behaviour opposes the action. 5. A judicial
decision has no effect with respect to a person whose interests are protected
by the legal action, but who has made clear that he does not want to be
affected by this decision, unless the nature of the judicial decision brings
along that it is not possible to exclude this specific person from its effect
BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [Dutch Civil Code] art. 3:305(a) (Neth.). See Arons & Van
Boom, supra note 23, at 862–65 (describing the 1994 Act on Collective Action); Tzankova &
Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 15, at 152 (discussing the history of collective actions in the
Netherlands).
67
Jonathan Doak, Victims’ Rights in Criminal Trials: Prospects for Participation, 32 J.
LAW & SOC. 294 (2005).
68
For a general overview of Belgian criminal procedure, see Brigitte Pesquié, The Belgian
System, in EUROPEAN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 81, 81–141 (Mireille Delmas-Marty & J.R.
Spencer eds., 2002).
69
STEPHEN O’MALLEY & ALEXANDER LAYTON, EUROPEAN CIVIL PROCEDURE 1171, 1183
(1989). See Section 4 of the Preliminary Title of the Belgian Code of Criminal Procedure.
CODE D’INSTRUCTION CRIMINELLE [C.I.Cr.] ch. 1, § 4 (Belg.). For an analysis of the Belgian
piggyback, or partie civile, technique see CHRIS VAN DEN WYNGAERT, STRAFRECHT,
STRAFPROCESRECHT & INTERNATIONAAL STRAFRECHT (6th ed.) 780–803 (2006); RAF
VERSTRAETEN, DIRK VAN DAELE, ANN BAILLEUX & JOOST HUYSMANS, DE BURGERLIJKE
PARTIJSTELLING: ANALYSE EN TOEKOMSTPERSPECTIEF 19–76 (2012) (who also give an
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the criminal aspect of the case and has convicted the defendant, he or she
will rule upon the civil claims. In the event the judge acquits the defendant,
he or she will not rule upon the civil claim. In that case, the victim can
initiate a civil case based on another cause of action, such as negligence, if
the defendant was acquitted of fraud. But, the victim is barred from bringing
a civil claim on the cause of action on which the defendant was acquitted.
The gain for the victim in bringing his or her claim during the criminal
proceedings is that he or she can “piggyback” on the evidence brought
forward by the Public Prosecutor, thus he or she only has to prove damages
and causation. This technique may potentially have an important impact in
mass cases. In principle, the criminal case may function as a de facto issue
class action on the issue of liability.
3. Where That Leaves Belgium Right Now
The traditional procedural techniques, as well as the existing Belgian
statutory collective actions and the piggyback technique, are deficient tools
for the redress of collective harms.70 Their main weakness is their opt-in
feature, which means they do not work for small claims.
The techniques of joinder of claims and claims in intervention remain
embedded in an individualistic context because they are exclusively designed
for small party litigation. Their only added value is that they allow the
intervention of a limited number of people. Furthermore, third parties have
to intervene in the proceedings, and just like the initial plaintiff and
defendant, they have to become formal parties to the proceeding.71 This is
also the case for party representation. The representative must be authorized
by each individual member of the class on an opt-in basis.72 This technique

interesting comparative overview of the technique in Belgium, France, the Netherlands and
Germany). A victim can also choose not to piggyback on the criminal case, but rather initiate
a civil case. Where a concurrent criminal case against the same defendant is pending, the civil
judge will have to suspend the civil case until the criminal judge has ruled on the criminal
case. This principle is phrased in the French adage: “le criminel tient le civil en état.” It is
also possible for a victim to use both tracks: bringing his or her civil claim during the criminal
proceedings and piggybacking on the Public Prosecutor on the one hand, and initiating a
separate civil case on the other hand. This is done frequently in big cases when the statute of
limitations in the criminal case could be tolled. As a precaution, victims initiate civil
proceedings as a backup; in case the criminal case is dismissed. In most cases, and because of
the “le criminel tient le civil en état”-rule, these civil proceedings are suspended awaiting the
outcome of the criminal case.
70
Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 325.
71
See sources cited supra notes 41–48 (describing claim and party joinder in Belgium).
72
See sources cited supra note 49 (describing the requirements for party representation in
Belgium).
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involves laborious administration costs since the representative has to reach
every member and obtain their written consent and authorization.
Statutory collective actions are rarely used in Belgium. Their biggest
shortcoming is the impossibility of claiming damages, as they can only be
used for injunctive or declaratory relief.73 Associations and organizations
also lack financial means to initiate them. As mentioned hereafter,74
contingency fee arrangements are not possible in Belgium. Moreover, the
judgments in these cases are not binding for the individual class members. If
they want financial compensation, they must individually sue the
defendant.75 Since they were not party to the proceedings initiated by the
association or organization, they cannot invoke the claim preclusive effect of
that decision, or the issue preclusive effect, since issue preclusion does not
exist in Belgium.
Most of the Belgian mass cases mentioned hereafter were criminal cases
in which a combination of the piggyback, or partie civile, technique and
party representation was used. The civil parties (e.g., the deceived
shareholders) gave a mandate to an association or organization to bring, on
their behalf, their civil claim before the criminal judge.76 At first sight, one
would think that the piggyback technique for class members only has
advantages: it is easily accessible, informal, and cheap. The drawback
however is that it remains an opt-in system and all claimants are treated as
separate parties. All civil parties have to come forward and give a mandate
to a representative. In mass criminal cases, this opt-in requirement is simply
unmanageable.
II. PROPOSALS FOR A BELGIAN CLASS ACTION
A. Trigger-Effect
In most European countries, some tangible cases were a trigger for
action.77 For example, the DES case (a pharmaceutical product liability case)
in the Netherlands led to the Dutch Collective Settlements Act.78 The
German KapMuG was created as a result of the Deutsche Telekom AG case
73

See sources cited supra note 57 (describing statutory collective actions and the type of
relief they provide party members).
74
See infra Part III.C.2 (discussing financing of class actions by class counsel).
75
VOET, supra note 3, at 46.
76
See cases discussed infra Part II.
77
VOET, supra note 3, at 49.
78
See Tzankova & Lunsingh Scheurleer, supra note 15, at 155 (describing the legislative
changes needed to effectuate the DES settlement). For a brief analysis of the DES case, with
references, see John H. Wansink & Jaap Spier, Joint and Several Liability of DES
Manufacturers: A Dutch Tort Crisis?, 1 INT’L INS. L. REV. 176 (1993).
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(a securities case).79 During the last decades, Belgium was also confronted
with a number of high-profile mass cases.80
Some were single-incident mass torts involving personal injuries and
death. On New Year’s Eve 1994, a fire broke out in the Switel hotel in
Antwerp. Fifteen people were killed and 164 injured. In June 1995, sixteen
people died in a gas explosion of a road restaurant in Eynatten (in the
province of Liège). In February 1996, ten were killed and eighty injured in a
multiple collision on a highway in Kruishoutem. In the summer of 1997, a
Jordan Falcon plane crashed during an air show in Ostend. Eight bystanders
were killed and forty injured. On July 30, 2004, there was a gas explosion in
the industrial zone of Ghislenghien (a small town in the province of
Hainaut). Twenty-four people were killed, 132 were injured, 400 people
suffered damages and insurance companies had to pay €28,5 million.81 On
February 15, 2010, two passenger trains collided in Halle (near Brussels).
Eighteen people were killed and more than 100 were injured. In May 2013, a
train transporting chemicals derailed in Wetteren. Dozens of people were
injured. Hundreds could not go back to their houses for days.
Others involved financial harms to shareholders.82 In 2001, Lernout &
Hauspie Speech Products (L&H), a speech recognition technology company
based in Ypres, went bankrupt due to overstated earnings, fictitious
transactions, and improper accounting methodologies.83 During the criminal
trial in 2007, it took several days for the more than 15,000 piggybacking
victims to bring their civil claims. After three years, in 2010 the court

79

Stürner, supra note 13, at 252. For an analysis of the Deutsche Telekom AG case, with
references, see id. at 253. On May 2012, the Frankfurt Court of Appeal issued the model
decision in the Deutsche Telekom AG case. The Court ruled in favor of Deutsche Telekom by
deciding that there was no prospectus liability because there were no misrepresentations in
Deutsche Telekom’s prospectus. Oberlandesgericht [OLGZ] [Higher Regional Court – Civil
Matters] May 16, 2012. The decision is available in German at http://sustainableprivatelaw.fi
les.wordpress.com/2012/06/musterentscheid_olg_frankfurt_am_main_telekom.pdf.
80
Most of these cases are analyzed in Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 325–27 and
VOET, supra note 3, at 50–54.
81
This case was decided in appeal by the Court of Appeal of Mons. Cours d’Appel [CA]
[Court of Appeal] Mons, June 28, 2011, NR 2010/H/130.
82
In the context of an international research collaborative, led by Professors Deborah
Hensler (Stanford Law School), Christopher Hodges (Universities of Oxford and Rotterdam),
and Ianika Tzankova (University of Tilburg), I have conducted an empirical study of the L&H
case. This case study (The L&H Case: Belgium’s Internet Bubble Story) will be published in
2013 in a book.
83
Because L&H had a second headquarter in Burlington, MA, the case also led to some
class action settlements in the U.S. See, e.g., In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 138 F.
Supp. 2d 39 (D. Mass. 2001); In re Lernout & Hauspie Sec. Litig., 208 F. Supp. 2d 74 (D.
Mass. 2002); Warlop v. Lernout, 473 F. Supp. 2d 260 (D. Mass. 2007) (granting defendants
motion to dismiss the class action on forum non conveniens grounds where the class included
mostly foreign investors who purchased L&H stock on the European Stock Exchange).
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reached a criminal verdict, and the major administrators of L&H were
convicted.84 Dexia and KPMG, L&H’s financial and accounting partners,
were acquitted. The civil claims are still pending. In another example, as a
result of the worldwide financial crisis in 2008, Fortis Bank, the crown jewel
of the Belgian financial world whose main shareholder was the Belgian
government, had to be sold to BNP Paribas to avoid bankruptcy.85 This
takeover led to several legal proceedings initiated by aggrieved minority
shareholders. In some of these cases there were more than 2,000 plaintiffs.86
Triggered by those mass cases, three proposals were made public in 2009
and 2010 to introduce class actions in Belgium.87 The proposals were
launched by the former Ministers of Consumer Affairs and Justice,88 the two
Green opposition parties,89 and the Flemish Bar Council.90 At the moment,
none of these proposals have been submitted to Parliament. In case the
Belgian government decides to undertake action, it is most likely that the
2009 proposal by the government will be taken as a starting point, as was

84
Cours d’Appel [CA] [Court of Appeal] Ghent, Sept. 20, 2010, NR. 1/VR/07. The
decision is available in Dutch at http://www.juridat.be/beroep/gent/index.htm.
85
This case is briefly discussed in Adrienne Coleton, Banking Insolvency Regimes and
Cross-Border Banks – Complexities and Conflicts: Is the Current European Insolvency
Framework Efficient and Robust Enough to Effectively Resolve Cross-Border Banks, Can
There Be a One Size Fits All Solution?, 27 J. INT’L BANKING L. & REG. 63 (2012) and John
Goddard & Phil Molyneux, The Financial Crisis in Europe: Evolution, Policy Responses and
Lessons for the Future, 17 J. FIN. REG. & COMPLIANCE 362 (2009).
86
President of the Commercial Court of Brussels, Nov. 18, 2008 (A. et al. v. Fortis, SFPI &
BNP Paribas), TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR BELGISCH HANDELSRECHT [TBH-RDC], at 902 (2008);
President of the Commercial Court of Brussels, Nov. 18, 2008 (Deminor v. Fortis, SFPI &
BNP Paribas), JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [JT], at 703 (2008); Brussels Court of Appeal, Dec.
12, 2008 (A. et al. v. Fortis, SFPI & BNP Paribas), JOURNAL DES TRIBUNAUX [JT], at 62
(2009).
87
For a thorough analysis of these proposals see Taelman & Voet, supra note 30, at 333–42
and VOET, supra note 3, at 169–75, 231–37, 295–98, 355–62.
88
Andrée Puttemans & Hakim Boularbah, Wetsontwerp betreffende de procedures tot
collectieve schadeafwikkeling [Draft Law on Collective Redress Procedures], Apr. 29, 2010,
available at http://www.tijd.be/massaschade [hereinafter Government Proposal]; see also
infra note 94 and accompanying text (discussing the government proposal).
89
“Wetsvoorstel tot wijziging van het Gerechtelijk Wetboek wat het instellen van een
collectieve rechtszaak betreft” (in Dutch) – “Proposition de loi modifiant le Code judiciaire en
ce qui concerne l’instauration d’une procédure collective” (in French). See infra note 101 and
accompanying text.
90
Patrick Hofströssler & Philippe De Jaegere, Wetsvoorstel tot invoering van Titel XXVI
over de collectieve vorderingen in Boek IV van het gerechtelijk wetboek [Bill Establishing
Title XXVI of the Collective Actions in Book IV of the Judicial Code], available at http://
www.advocaat.be/UserFiles/Positions/OVB-wetsvoorstel%20class%20actions%20website.pdf
[hereinafter Flemish Bar Council Proposal]; see also infra note 104 and accompanying text
(describing the proposal of the Flemish Bar Council).
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announced in the media by the new Minister of Consumer Affairs in May
2012.91
B. Government Proposal
At the end of 2006, the Belgian Minister of Consumer Affairs, Freya Van
den Bossche (a Flemish socialist), set up a working group to reflect on a
possible class action in consumer affairs.92 Because it was not clear in the
beginning what kind of action she wanted, the first outcome was a
questionnaire containing detailed questions that had to be answered before a
proposal could be drafted.93 At the end of 2007, Van den Bossche had to
resign and Paul Magnette, a Walloon socialist, took over. The class action
idea received little attention for some time, but was resuscitated in early
2009. In a short period of time a proposition was made public in September
2009.94 Immediately, the idea of American-style class actions made business
associations shiver.95 The Federation of Enterprises in Belgium declared that
it was going to do everything to prevent this kind of legislative initiative in
times of economic crisis.96 Because of the Belgian political crisis97 and the
91
Marjan Justaert, Slachtoffers straks in groep naar de rechter: Collectieve schadeclaims
en groepsvorderingen in stroomversnelling, DE STANDAARD, May 3, 2012, http://www.stand
aard.be/artikel/detail.aspx?artikelid=4S3PI01B.
92
Question de M. Dylan Casaer à la vice-première minister et minister de la Justice sur “les
‘class actions,’ ” No. 14614 11 April 2007, available at http://www.lachambre.be/doc/CCRI/
pdf/51/ic1269.pdf.
93
This questionnaire was written by academics from the University of Ghent (Professor
Piet Taelman, Professor Reinhard Steennot, and myself).
94
Government Proposal, supra note 88. For an analysis of the proposal by its authors, see
Hakim Boularbah, Des actions groupées vers l’ action de groupe: Quelle valeur ajoutée pour
l’avocat?, in LA VALEUR AJOUTÉE DE L’AVOCAT 33 (2011) and Andrée Puttemans,
L’introduction d’une forme d’action collective en droit belge, in L’ACTION COLLECTIVE OU
ACTION DE GROUPE: SE PREPARER À SON INTRODUCTION EN DROIT FRANÇAIS ET EN DROIT BELGE
24 (A. Legendre ed., 2010).
95
Bientôt une « class action » en Belgique [Soon a “Class Action” in Belgium], L’ECHO,
Sept. 16, 2009; Rel over nieuwe wet massale schadeclaims [Agitation over New Law on Mass
Claims], DE MORGEN, Sept. 16, 2009; België krijgt wet op ‘class action suits’ [Belgium Gets
New Law on “Class Action Suits”], DE TIJD, Sept. 16, 2009.
96
Storme & Terryn, supra note 49, at 103 n.26.
97
After five state reforms (in 1970, 1980, 1988–89, 1993, and 2001), Belgium became a
federal state, composed of three cultural communities (the Flemish Community, the French
Community, and the German-speaking Community) and three economic regions (the Flemish
Region, the Brussels Capital Region, and the Walloon Region). See JOHAN VANDE LANOTTE
& GEERT GOEDERTIER, OVERZICHT PUBLIEKRECHT 869–916 (2003). The 2007–2011 political
crisis was rooted in the increasingly conflicting views between the Flemish and the Walloons
about a new state reform—the Flemish wanted to devolve more powers to the communities
and the regions; an idea opposed by the Walloons—and the existence of the controversial
electoral district of Brussels-Halle-Vilvoorde (BHV) that had to be divided. After the June
2010 elections a consensus could not be reached, which led to a period of 541 days of

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

452

8/28/2013 9:56 AM

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

[Vol. 41:433

absence of a federal government for more than 500 days after the June 2010
elections, the class action idea faded into the background. In May 2012, the
new Minister for Consumer Affairs, the Flemish socialist Johan Vande
Lanotte, announced his interest in reviving the proposal.98
The core of the proposal is a double pathway: a partially out-of-court
settlement track (based on the Dutch Collective Settlements Act)99 and a
court-based litigation track (based on the Quebecian class action).100 The
double pathway is summarized in this scheme:
CLASS ACTION SETTLEMENT
(NEGOTIATED OUT OF COURT)

CLASS ACTION
(COURT BASED)

petition for approval

introduction by petition

certification decision

possibility for parties to negotiate

agreement

approval by the court

no agreement

opt-out (or opt-in)

opt-out (or opt-in)

decision on the
merits

remuneration

remuneration

government formation. For a good understanding of the differences between the Flemish and
the Walloons see Robert Mnookin & Alain Verbeke, Persistent Nonviolent Conflict with No
Reconciliation: The Flemish and Walloons in Belgium, 72 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 151 (2009).
98
Justaert, supra note 91.
99
See Government Proposal, supra note 88, arts. 17–24 (describing the proposed settlement
track).
100
See id. arts. 25–38 (describing the litigation track).
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Both are real representative actions. The class representative can act on
behalf of a class of unknown fellow-sufferers without them having to
intervene or opt-in. Moreover, the settlement and the action lead to a
decision that is binding on all parties involved.
C. Opposition Proposal
A second proposal was made by the two Green opposition parties, Ecolo
and Groen.101 The explanatory memorandum of the proposal makes clear
that the mass disasters mentioned above illustrate the need for class actions
in Belgian civil procedure. After giving an overview of the different types of
mass disasters (mass disaster accidents and mass exposure accidents), the
point of departure of the Opposition Proposal with the Government’s is the
deficiency of Belgian law to offer collective redress. The memorandum
recites the traditional advantages of class actions—access to justice, equality
of procedural arms, procedural economy and efficiency, an enhanced
settlement environment, the deterrence effect, etc.—and compares the
Belgian status quaestionis with the recent legislative initiatives in the
Netherlands, Germany and Sweden.
The proposal suggests a collective procedure, consisting of two phases:102
a collective phase, during which the common issues are resolved and the
individual class members have to opt-in,103 and an individual phase during
which the individual issues are dealt with. Three justifications are invoked
for this division. First, during a long opt-in period, the class can be formed,
meanwhile, and without any delay, the common questions can be resolved.
Second, at the end of the first phase, the class will be formed and the
common questions answered. This enhances the possibility of reaching a
settlement. And third, a separate phase focusing only on the individual
aspects of the damages, gives the individual victim his or her day in court.

101
Opposition Proposal, supra note 89. The proposal was re-submitted on February 6, 2012
and is available at http://www.dekamer.be/FLWB/PDF/53/2035/53K2035001.pdf [hereinafter
Re-Submitted Opposition Proposal].
102
Opposition Proposal, supra note 89.
103
The members of a class opting-in must deposit a declaration at the court registry. This
declaration must contain the identity of the individual, his or her contact information,
documents that prove the individual falls within the scope of application as determined by the
judge in the certification decision, a detailed statement of his or her damages, and documents
proving those damages. The declaration, which is irrevocable, must be done within the time
limit imposed by the judge. All declarations deposited after the time limit has expired are
inadmissible. See Re-Submitted Opposition Proposal, supra note 101, art. 1237/4 (describing
the proposed requirements and procedure for opting-in).
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D. Proposal of the Flemish Bar Council
A third and final proposal was made by the Flemish Bar Council.104
According to this proposal, a class action must be brought before the district
court. A Belgian district court is a special court composed of the President
of the Court of First Instance, the President of the Labor Court, and the
President of the Commercial Court.105 The district court only decides
jurisdictional disputes between different courts of first instance.106 The
Flemish Bar Council wants to provide this court with a pivotal role in
deciding class actions, but only in the certification and potential settlement
phase. If the class action is certified, the district court will refer the case to a
competent first instance court that will decide the merits of the case.107 If a
settlement is reached during the procedure, the parties have to go back to the
district court for approval of the settlement. The standard is low. The court
will only verify that the settlement is not clearly unreasonable for the
victims.108 An important detail is that the non-binding advice of the Public
Prosecutor is needed to approve the settlement. With respect to the
individual distribution of damages, the proposal allows the court to appoint a
judicial claim settler or special master for that purpose.109
E. Main Characteristics
The main characteristics of the three Belgian class action proposals are
summarized in the table below:

104
Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 90. For an analysis of the proposal by one of
its authors, see Patrick Hofströssler, Waarom een ‘class action’ in België? Krijtlijnen van het
voorstel van de Orde van Vlaamse Balies [Why Class Actions in Belgium?: Chalk Lines of
the Proposal of the Flemish Bar Association], 54 ORDE VAN DE DAG 95 (2011) and Patrick
Hofströssler, Een Belgische class action: de OVB schrijft, in LIBER AMICORUM JO STEVENS
353 (Veerle Allaerts et al., eds. 2011).
105
CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] arts. 74–75 (Belg.).
106
Id. art. 642.
107
Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 90, art. 1385-5.
108
Id. art. 1385-9.
109
Id. art. 1385-10.

STRUCTURE

settlement: petition,
approval, opt-out(in),
remuneration action:
petition, certification,
negotiation, if no
agreement: opt-out
(in), decision on the
merits, remuneration

a collective phase (for
the common issues)
and an individual
phase (for the
individual issues)

a certification phase
before the district
court; a phase on the
merits of the case
before the competent
first instance court; an
individual phase
(distribution of
compensations)
potentially out of court
(with a judicial claim
settler)

PROCEDURES –
LEGISLATIVE
FRAMEWORK

two collective
procedures (class action
settlement – class
action) outside the
Judicial Code

one procedure
(collective procedure) in
the Judicial Code

one procedure
(collective actions) in
the judicial code

GOVERNMENT
PROPOSAL

OPPOSITION
PROPOSAL

PROPOSAL OF THE
FLEMISH COUNCIL

any interested
individual party
(a natural person,
a legal person, an
association, a
government, etc.)
certification
phase: every
district court;
after that: the
competent first
instance court

every court

Brussels Court
of First
Instance and
Brussels Court
of Appeal

COURT

certification of
1° traditional
procedural
techniques are
insufficient, 2°
there are
common legal
and factual
questions and
common
questions with
respect to the
evidence, 3° the
case at hand is
representative, 4°
preference has to
be given to a
collective action

(not really clear)
the concrete
mass disaster, the
common legal
questions, the
suitability of a
collective
procedure

certification if
procedure (a)
tends to redress
mass disputes
and (b) is
initiated by a
class
representative

PREREQUISITES

opt-in or optout (both are
possible)
decided by the
judge)

opt-in, but optout when a
settlement is
reached

opt-out
(exceptionally
opt-in) for
Belgian
residents, opt-in
for non-Belgian
residents

OPT-IN/OPTOUT

the judge will
decide (in a
discretionary
matter) in the
certification
decision

(not really clear)
the judge will
decide in the
certification
decision and there
will be notice
through the court
registry

register for
collective
procedures

NOTICE TO THE
CLASS

partially through a
fund (of which the
name and the
modalities are
unclear); the judge
can decide that the
members of the class
have to make a
contribution to this
fund (after
certification or after
winning the case); if
the class loses the
case, the winning
party can obtain a
composition out of
the fund (but not
from individual class
members)

calling in an existent
government fund;
financed by the
government and
required
contributions of
members who opt-in

funding by the
associations; if
damages fall under a
certain threshold,
these will not be
distributed and could
fee a government
fund that will
finance future
procedures

FUNDING

2013]

individual party
(can ask that his
individual
procedure will be
pursued as a
collective
procedure)

associations, all
of which the
statutory aim
corresponds with
the object of the
settlement or the
claim

INITIATOR
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III. WHAT SHOULD A BELGIAN CLASS ACTION LOOK LIKE?
A. Purposes of the Class Action Device and Why the Current Situation is
Inadequate
The traditional objectives of class actions are access to justice, judicial
economy, and behavior modification.110 The first objective is fundamental.
“Class actions can enhance access to justice by opening the ‘doors’ of our
courts to those with individually non-recoverable claims or whose claims
would not have led to individual proceedings because of social or
psychological barriers.”111
At first sight, the Belgian procedural techniques (joinder of claims, claims
in intervention, party representation, and the piggyback, or partie civile,
technique in criminal cases) attempt to enhance judicial economy. This was
surely the ambition of the Royal Commissioner Charles Van Reepinghen in
1967, when he drafted the Judicial Code. The techniques of joinder of
claims and claims in intervention allow all interested parties to deal with all
of their claims in one single procedure, thereby avoiding multiple and
sequential proceedings.112 Closer analysis reveals a more sober image. As
mentioned above, the techniques require class members to actively intervene
(opt-in) in the proceedings. Consequently, they do not work for small
claims. Because of the rational lack of interest and the negative cost-benefit
analysis, class members will simply not intervene or come forward to give a
mandate to a representative. Moreover, the techniques require all class
members to be aware of the proceedings before they can intervene, which
requires broad notice.113 Therefore, these techniques will offer no collective
redress at all.
110
These objectives were saliently summarized in the Canadian decisions of Western
Canadian Shopping Centres, Inc. v. Dutton, [2001] 2 S.C.R. 534 (Can.); Rumley v. British
Columbia, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 184 (Can.); Hollick v. Toronto City, [2001] 3 S.C.R. 158 (Can.);
see also MULHERON, supra note 10, at 47–66 (describing the objectives of class action
regimes). John Kleefeld recently noted that “[b]ehaviour modification or deterrence . . . tend
to be viewed as by-products of access to justice or as related to their effects on the ability to
aggregate low-value claims. If you like, access to justice and judicial economy are the elder
siblings; behaviour modification is the junior one – or even the poor cousin.” John C.
Kleefeld, Homo Legislativus: Missing Link in the Evolution of ‘Behaviour Modification’?, in
ACCESSING JUSTICE: APPRAISING CLASS ACTIONS TEN YEARS AFTER DUTTON, HOLLICK AND
RUMLEY 170, 171 (Jasminka Kalajdzic ed. 2011).
111
Vince Morabito, Ideological Plaintiffs and Class Actions: An Australian Perspective, 34
U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 459, 502–03 (2000–2001).
112
VAN REEPINGHEN, supra note 37, at 327.
113
VOET, supra note 3, at 24. The limitations of these procedural techniques are also
recognized in the U.S. See FLEMING JAMES, JR., GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR. & JOHN
LEUBSDORF, CIVIL PROCEDURE 644 (5th ed., 2001) (“Class actions, aside from involving many
people, differ from such traditional disputes in many ways: flexibility of remedy,
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But even in cases of larger claims, the aforementioned techniques do not
fully achieve their judicial economy objective. The fact that all class
members have to intervene can lead to an uncoordinated and fragmented, and
therefore inefficient and uneconomical, completion of the case. This can
cause an overloaded, even disrupted, judicial system. Moreover, this mode
of operation will trigger a race to the courthouse in cases involving a
defendant with limited funds.
Belgian statutory collective actions are injunctive or preventive actions.114
Only the cessation or prevention of an illegal practice can be claimed. It is
not possible to claim damages for class members. Therefore, the exclusive
objective of these actions is behavior modification. An individual victim of
an illegal practice is not a party to the proceeding, and is not bound by its
outcome. If victims want compensation, they must initiate individual
proceedings without being able to invoke the preclusive effect of the
decision.115 Statutory collective actions do not offer victims easier access to
justice or judicial economy.
What is clearly missing is a tool offering optimal access to justice for
victims of mass cases. Neither the traditional procedural techniques, nor the
statutory collective actions create credible access to justice for a victim of a
mass harm. Both the proposal of the government and the proposal of the
Flemish Bar Council want to correct this problem by introducing an opt-out
class action.116
B. Who Should Represent the Class?
1. Ideological Plaintiff as Class Representative
The existing, but limited, statutory collective actions in Belgium can only
be initiated by associations or organizations that satisfy certain legal criteria
(e.g., having legal personality for some years, usually three). Moreover, the
statutory aim of these associations or organizations must correspond or
overlap with the cause of action.117
predominance of administrative problems, an expanded judicial role, lawyers who must strive
to protect many clients whose interests may diverge, and a greater concern with litigation’s
effects on the real world.”).
114
Dalcq, supra note 57, at 168–71; Ramquet & Jones, supra note 57, at 49.
115
The claim preclusive effect of a decision only extends to the parties that were involved in
the proceedings. CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 23 (Belg.).
116
Government Proposal, supra note 88, art. 4; Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note
88, art. 1385-8, sec. 2. Both proposals allow the judge to impose an opt-in system when this
would be more appropriate. The proposal of the Green opposition parties is based on an optin system. Opposition Proposal, supra note 90, art. 1237/4.
117
See supra Part I.B.2 (discussing the prerequisites for an association or an organization to
bring a representative action on behalf of class members).
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Contrary to the proposals of the two Green opposition parties and the
Flemish Bar Council, the Government’s proposal only gives standing to
associations or organizations to initiate a class action. The proposal puts
forward an ideological plaintiff as having:
[N]o private cause of action or grievance against the defendant;
[he/she] is permitted to commence a class proceeding on the
basis that the class members’ interests will be represented
properly and adequately; is expected to possess “special ability,
experience or resources that would allow it to be an appropriate
and adequate class representative”; and need not be a class
member.118
Contrary to the U.S., no standing is given to an individual class member.
The choice of an ideological plaintiff (an association, organization, or
governmental body, such as an ombudsman) is a good one for three reasons.
First, when an ideological plaintiff initiates a class action, the focus from the
outset will be on the class and not the personal claim of an individual class
member. This refers to the class-entity or class-as-client theory.119 The
collective interests of the class members as a whole will be the decisive and
motivating reason to initiate a class action. During the proceedings, these
interests will always come first, not those of an individual representative
class member or his or her attorney. Therefore, one may expect ideological
plaintiffs to pursue class actions more strongly, with more commitment and
enthusiasm, which will benefit the class members. In other words: “The
interests of the class are here likely to be much better served by an
ideological plaintiff.”120 Moreover, time-consuming procedural problems

118
MULHERON, supra note 10, at 303 (citing Arthur L. Close, British Columbia’s New Class
Action Legislation, 28 CAN. BUS. L.J. 271, 274 (1997)); see also Morabito, supra note 111, at
493–98 (providing a historical evolution of the ideological plaintiff).
119
David L. Shapiro, Class Actions: The Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
913, 917–18 (1998) (“The notion of the class as entity should prevail over more individually
oriented notions of aggregate litigation.”); see also John C. Coffee, Jr., Class Action
Accountability: Reconciling Exit, Voice, and Loyalty in Representative Litigation, 100
COLUM. L. REV. 370, 379 (2000); Edward H. Cooper, Rule 23: Challenges to the Rulemaking
Process, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 13, 26–32 (1996); Samuel Issacharoff, Preclusion, Due Process,
and the Right to Opt Out of Class Actions, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057, 1058–60 (2002);
Martin H. Redish & Nathan D. Larsen, Class Actions, Litigant Autonomy, and the
Foundations of Procedural Due Process, 95 CAL. L. REV. 1573, 1588–97 (2007) (describing
the class entity theory).
120
South African Law Commission, The Recognition of a Class Action in South African
Law ¶ 5.5 (Working Paper No. 57, 1995).
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will not occur when the individual claim of the class representative becomes
moot or is settled by the defendant.121
Second, when an ideological plaintiff initiates a class action, no
individual class member needs to come forward. Thus, there is no danger of
stigmatization and possible retaliation by the defendant.122 One should not
forget that a class action is a complex event, not only because it deals with
large-scale and sometimes well-publicized cases, but also because of the
importance of the interests of the absent class members. These members
have to rely on the class representative, who therefore has a burdensome
task.123 The complexity and psychological impact of a class action can easily
scare off potential class representatives, or can hamper the procedure. This
is particularly important in cases of discrimination or violations of
constitutional or civil rights, where class members are in an inherently
vulnerable position. Examples of vulnerable class members include
employees, prisoners, members of a minority class, asylum seekers, minors,
or victims of sexual abuse.124 All these problems are largely avoided, or can
be more easily dealt with, when the class representative is an ideological
plaintiff.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, when the class representative is an
association or governmental body, it will be easier to finance the litigation.
This will be discussed further.125
2. Burns’ “Decorative Figurehead”
The traditional U.S. idea that a class representative with a personal
interest is in the best position to advance the interests of fellow class
members is no longer convincing.126 A number of class action authorities
agree that ideological plaintiffs are preferable to plaintiffs with a personal
121

See Jean Wegman Burns, Standing and Mootness in Class Actions: A Search for
Consistency, 22 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1239 (1989) (analyzing mootness in a class action
context); David H. Donaldson, Jr., Comment, A Search for Principles of Mootness in the
Federal Courts: Part One – The Continuing Impact Doctrines, 54 TEX. L. REV. 1289, 1296–
1300 (1976).
122
ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, 1 REPORT ON CLASS ACTIONS 128–32 (1982).
123
Pierre-Claude Lafond, Consumer Class Actions in Quebec to the Year 2000: New Trends,
New Incentives, 8 CONSUMER L.J. 329, 332 (2000) (“The responsibility involved in carrying a
class action is very heavy – inordinately heavy for an isolated individual. Alone against
Goliath, the modern David of the judicial forum cannot share the burden he carries with
anyone except his lawyer. This burden constitutes one of the factors underlying the difficulty
in finding a representative.”).
124
See, e.g., Stanley D. Davis & Kathy Perkins Brooks, The Employment Class Action:
Recent Developments and Ideas for Discussion, 2 SEDONA CONF. J. 109, 114 (2001).
125
See infra Part III.C.
126
Morabito, supra note 111, at 496.
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stake. An initial argument is that these individual plaintiffs do not actually
control or direct the litigation.127 They are “merely a ‘key’ that the attorney
needs to open the courtroom doors.”128 Although the U.S. Congress has
made an effort to minimize the role of the lead plaintiff,129 class actions still
remain lawyer-driven.130
Second, it is argued that the fictional participation of individual plaintiffs
introduces artificial and unnecessary issues of commonality, typicality, and
adequacy of representation. In a pioneering paper from 1990, Jean Wegman
Burns labeled the U.S. class representative as a “decorative figurehead.”131
From a theoretical point of view, and partially caused by the dual
jurisprudence of the U.S. Supreme Court, the role of the class representative
is ambiguous.132
Apart from filling a space on the caption of the complaint, the
purpose served by the named plaintiff’s presence remains a
largely unanswered question. . . . [T]here is a general
recognition that the named plaintiff is largely a figurehead who
plays little or no part in the initiation and prosecution of the
class claim. . . . The time has come to think about the
unthinkable: eliminating the class representative. He serves no
function in the actual prosecution of the class action. Yet his
presence engenders confusion and the proliferation of phantom
issues in class action jurisprudence. Furthermore, having a
127
John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of
Economic Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86
COLUM. L. REV. 669 (1986); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Regulation of Entrepreneurial
Litigation: Balancing Fairness and Efficiency in the Large Class Action, 54 U. CHI. L. REV.
877 (1987); Mary Kay Kane, Of Carrots and Sticks: Evaluating the Role of the Class Action
Lawyer, 66 TEX. L. REV. 385 (1987); Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Auctioning
Class Action and Derivative Suits: A Rejoinder, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 458 (1993).
128
Antonio Gidi, Class Actions in Brazil: A Model for Civil Law Countries, 51 AM. J. COMP.
L. 311, 369 (2003).
129
For example, the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA) placed restrictions
on which injured class members can serve as lead plaintiff. “[T]he court shall adopt a
presumption that the most adequate plaintiff in any private action arising under [the PSLRA]
is the person or groups of persons that . . . in the determination of the court, has the largest
financial interest in the relief sought by the class.” 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(3)(B)(iii)(I); see also
Kendra S. Langlois, Putting the Plaintiff Class’ Needs in the Lead: Reforming Class Action
Litigation by Extending the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation
Reform Act, 44 WM. & MARY L. REV. 855 (2002) (extrapolating the lead plaintiff provision of
the PSLRA to other types of class action litigation).
130
Linda S. Mullenix, Resolving Aggregate Mass Tort Litigation: The New Private Law
Dispute Resolution Paradigm, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 413, 432–33 (1999).
131
Jean Wegman Burns, Decorative Figureheads: Eliminating Class Representatives in
Class Actions, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 165 (1990).
132
Id. at 168–202.

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

2013]

8/28/2013 9:56 AM

CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF GROUP LITIGATION

461

named plaintiff tends to obscure the fundamentally
nontraditional nature of the class action and to divert courts
from addressing directly the peculiar problems inherent in
group litigation.133
Third, the fiction of individual plaintiffs can undermine the goals of the
class action device, in the sense that it can lead to conflicts of interest
between the class representative and the class. This issue is considered by
the South African Law Commission.
In fact the self-interest of the representative may very well
defeat the interests of the class, as has happened in the United
States when the defendant hastily settles the plaintiff’s claim,
leaving the class without a representative. There is a real
probability that many plaintiffs with a self-interest prosecute
their claims as class actions in the hope of pressurizing the
defendant to offer a settlement more favorable than might have
been forthcoming had an individual action been brought. The
interests of the class are here likely to be much better served by
an ideological plaintiff.134
Just like Burns, the Commission considers a class member as class
representative as a mere fiction:
Where redress is sought in the interests of [groups who are
unable to initiate proceedings] it will usually be at the instance
of some organization which has the interests of the community
at heart, or possible some concerned individual. Where this is
the case there is no sense at all in requiring the concerned
organization or individual to find a member of the group to act
as nominal representative. Such a nominal representative
might be incapable of playing a meaningful role as
representative for the group and one then has the situation
where the concerned organization or individual is in fact
driving the litigation but a pretence is kept up that the
instructions derive from the named representative. This
presents the court with a fiction and forces the players into
situations which are often not entirely honest and sometimes
unethical. There is nothing to be gained by insisting on a

133
134

Id.
South African Law Commission, supra note 120, para. 5.5.
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nominal plaintiff. It the party driving the litigation is allowed
to be the representative party despite the absence of a personal
interest the court will know exactly where the various parties
stand and will be able to make a valid assessment of the
situation.135
3. Adequacy of Representation
The question that arises is what if an ideological plaintiff, just like a
natural plaintiff, does not pursue its own ideological interest, and whether
that could be detrimental to the economic interests of the class. Issacharoff
and Miller observe that:
[E]ven dedicated and idealistic people may not act as faithful
champions when their guiding principles do not overlap with
the interests of those they are assigned to represent. . . . The
interests of nonprofit consumer organizations may reflect
ideological considerations that may not necessarily coincide
with the economic interests of consumers.136
They suggest allowing associations and organizations to represent only
their own members rather than all persons injured by the challenged product
or practice.137 It is dubious whether it has to come to that, as long as certain
safeguards are provided, since this restriction would limit the class action
device that aims to offer access to justice and legal protection for all class
members.
First, standing has to be distinguished from adequacy of representation.138
An ideological plaintiff having class action standing is not automatically
135

Id.
Samuel Issacharoff & Geoffrey P. Miller, Will Aggregate Litigation Come to Europe?,
62 VAND. L. REV. 179, 194 (2009). They provide the following example:
Suppose, for example, that an organization empowered to act as a class
representative is committed to environmental protection – a noble aspiration,
but not one necessarily consonant with the interests of a class of consumers
who desire competitively priced products. If this organization selects cases
and litigation strategy on the basis of environmental considerations – going
easy, let’s say, on companies that donate money to Greenpeace while
vigorously pursuing companies that produce genetically modified crops – the
enforcement of consumer interests would be skewed in ways that do not
necessarily reflect the interests of consumers as a whole, who might prefer
cheaper prices to greener products.
Id. at 194.
137
Id. at 195.
138
See Hans-W. Micklitz, Collective Private Enforcement of Consumer Law: The Key
Questions, in COLLECTIVE ENFORCEMENT OF CONSUMER LAW: SECURING COMPLIANCE IN
136
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adequate to act as a class representative in a specific case.139 For example, a
Brazilian class action can be initiated by an association or governmental
body.140 The mere fact that they have standing is sufficient; there is no
additional inquiry into the adequacy of representation.141 According to Gidi,
this is disturbing.
It is generally feared that civil-law judges may not have the
power, the inclination or the professional ability needed to
examine adequacy of representation on a case-by-case basis.
Although difficult to assess, control of adequacy over the
representation of absentee’s interests may not be left
completely beyond judicial scrutiny. The role performed by
civil law judges may differ, perhaps substantially, from that
performed by common law judges. It does not necessarily
mean, however, that civil law judges are incapable of
exercising some control of adequacy of representation,
especially if they are supported by other devices.142
By contrast, when, as a result of a mass case, multiple associations
present themselves as a class representative, the class action mechanism
should force the court to determine which association or body is most
adequate to represent the class in that particular case.143 There should be no
first come, first serve principle.144 In other words, the adequacy of
representation test can obviate potential conflicts of interest. If it is clear
from the beginning that the ideological interests of the plaintiff prevail over
the economic interests of the class, the judge can rule that the plaintiff is not
adequate as a class representative. If the conflict of interest occurs during

EUROPE THROUGH PRIVATE ACTION AND PUBLIC AUTHORITY 11, 21 (Willem van Boom &
Marco Loos eds., 2007) (discussing the importance of the judge’s role in finding a plaintiff
that is suitable to represent the class’s interests).
139
Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 136, at 194.
140
CODIGO DE PROTEÇAO E DEFESA DO CONSUMIDOR [C.D.C.] art. 82 (Braz.).
141
Gidi, supra note 128, at 367.
142
Id. at 371–72 (adding that “[a] proposed class action bill at one time would have given
Brazilian judges the power to control adequacy of representation on a case-by-case basis.
This approach was never enacted, but it offered a more adequate solution to the inherent
problems of representative actions than the statute that was ultimately adopted by the
legislature.”).
143
The court should verify if the interests of the association are sufficiently aligned with
those of the class, the association has sufficient resources and willingness to use them to make
the litigation succeed, the association will persist when it is in the class’s interest, despite the
dangers of a loser-pays fee shift, the lawyer the association has chosen is sufficiently skilled
and well-staffed to represent the class, etc.
144
Micklitz, supra note 138, at 21–22.
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the procedure, the judge can substitute the class representative at the request
of a class member or even the defendant.
Second, attention should be drawn to the positive experiences with
existing associations and foundations in the aforementioned Belgian mass
cases,145 where they acted via the technique of party representation146 as
representatives for deceived shareholders. For example, in the L&H case
more than 15,000 shareholders were represented by Belgium’s biggest
consumer association and a large association defending minority
shareholders.147 The general perception by all actors involved was that these
associations vigorously defended the interests of their clients in the criminal
case.148 Also, the fact that one of the associations financed the litigation
proves that she prioritized the economic interests of her clients, over her own
ideological interests.149
Third, conflicts of interest can be restrained by self-regulating
mechanisms that regulate the role and the behavior of special purpose
associations in mass cases. An example can be found in the Netherlands.
The negative behavior of some special purpose associations in some mass
cases,150 led to a Claim Code containing principles on the responsibilities and
governance of such associations.151 The aim was to make those associations
more transparent with respect to, for example, internal decision making
processes, financial policies, and the composition and operating procedures
of boards of directors.152
C. How Should Class Action Litigation Be Financed?
With respect to the funding and financing of class action litigation, three
options can be discerned: financing by the class representative, financing by
the class counsel, and financing by a third party. The three Belgian class
145

See supra Part II.A.
See supra Part I.B.2.
147
See supra notes 83–85 and accompanying text (describing the L&H case).
148
See the empirical case study on the L&H case mentioned supra note 82.
149
Id.
150
See, e.g., COMMISSIE CLAIMCODE, CLAIMCODE, 2011 (Neth.), available at http://www.
consumentenbond.nl/morello-bestanden/716993/compljuniclaimcodecomm2011.pdf (appending
J.H. Lembstra & R.W. Okhuijsen, Consultatiedocument ‘Zelf-regelering Claimstichtingen,
TIJDSCHRIFT VOOR FINANCIEEL RECHT, June 2010 at 158, 159–61 (discussing the Lipsick Effect
Case, Hof – Amsterdam 7 oktober 2004, JOR 2004, 329 (Stichting Lipstick Effect/ABN AMRO)
(Neth.), where two lawyers set up an association for the purpose of initiating a legal procedure
against a bank, and the Woekerpolis affair, where concerns were raised about the revenues of the
acting associations)).
151
In June 2010, a commission ‘Claim Code’ was set up by a lawyer and a communication
advisor. After a large consultation round, the Code was presented in June 2011. Id.
152
Id.
146
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action proposals ignore this issue, or deal with it in a fragmented and unclear
manner. A clear and comprehensive vision is lacking. The only thing they
all agree on is funding by a government fund.
1. Financing By the Class Representative
One possibility to fund a class action is requiring the class representative
to fund and finance the litigation. This is already the case with the existing
Belgian statutory collective actions.153 If the class representative is an
individual class member, this means there will be no funding at all. This will
certainly be the case for small claims, but also for individually recoverable
claims. In those cases, funding a class action will come down to a personal
and unprofitable investment, which no one will want to make. If at the end
of the procedure the class member runs the risk of also having to pay the
costs of the defendant,154 there is “a disincentive to bringing grouped
proceedings, and [this] might in fact create yet another barrier to access to
legal remedies of the kind which the recommended procedure itself aims to
overcome.”155
Theoretical methods for creating greater incentives or pooling class
member resources seem unlikely to succeed. It would be possible to reward
the class member who stands up as a class representative with a financial
bonus, which would be an impetus to act. Mulheron pertinently points out
however, that this could lead to conflicts of interest.
Where a representative plaintiff benefits from the class
proceeding to a greater extent than the class members, and such
benefit is as a result of the extraneous compensation paid to the
representative plaintiff rather than the damages suffered by him
or her, there is undoubtedly an appearance of a conflict of
interest between the representative plaintiff and the class
members. This view holds that a class action should not be
viewed as a method by which persons can seek to receive
personal gain over and above any damages or other remedy to

153

VOET, supra note 3, at 147.
See, e.g., Garry D. Watson, Class Actions: The Canadian Experience, 11 DUKE J. COMP.
& INT’L L. 269, 274–77 (2001) (describing fee shifting in Ontario). “The Ontario costs rule is
problematic and causes difficulties because it raises the issue of who, properly advised, would
agree to become a representative plaintiff.” Id. at 275.
155
Australian Law Reform Comm’n, Grouped Proceedings in the Federal Court 107
(Report No. 46 1988).
154
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which they would otherwise be entitled on the merits of their
claims.156
It would also be possible to allow the class representative to solicit other
class members for financial contributions.157 This would be challenging,
however, because the class representative would act on behalf of an
unknown group of class members, who would be difficult to reach, and
sometimes, to identify. In cases of small claims, it would be hard to
persuade them to pay for the litigation. Therefore, Mulheron observes that
this technique:
is unlikely to be much utilised because of the disincentive to
class member participation which up-front funding would
entail. In any event, . . . the practicalities are that any potential
benefit is surely a bit remote at the time that this request for
contributions is normally made, at such an early stage of the
proceedings.158
If the class representative is an ideological plaintiff, such as an
association or governmental body, funding will be easier, because
ideological plaintiffs, at least the successful ones, have more financial
resources, such as membership contributions, subsidies, and other income.159
Moreover, they do not pursue a personal interest, but only the interests of the
class. Because class interests overlap with their statutory aim, the class
action goes to the heart of their existence.160 Ideological plaintiffs will
therefore act as gatekeepers, because they likely will not invest in frivolous
or meritless cases with the objective of profit.

156
MULHERON, supra note 10, at 466; see also In re Gould Sec. Litig., 727 F. Supp. 1201,
1209 (N.D. Ill. 1989) (“If class representatives expect routinely to receive special awards in
addition to their share of the recovery, the representative may be tempted to accept sub-optimal
settlements at the expense of the class members whose interests they are appointed to guard.”).
Under the American PSLRA, such awards are prohibited 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(a)(2)(A)(vi) (2012).
157
See Vince Morabito, Federal Class Actions, Contingency Fees, and the Rules Governing
Litigation Costs, 21 MONASH U. L. REV. 231, 236 (1995) (discussing a proposal to have class
representatives solicit other class members for financial contributions). See, e.g., Class
Proceedings Act, R.S.B.C. 1996 c. 50, s. 19(7) (Can. B.C.) (“With leave of the court, notice
under this section may include a solicitation of contributions from class members to assist in
paying solicitor’s fees and disbursements.”).
158
MULHERON, supra note 10, at 465.
159
See Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 136, at 199 (comparing difficulties with individual
class representative financing to organizational plaintiff financing).
160
See id. at 193–94 (discussing ideological loyalty of organizational plaintiffs).
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That Belgian associations and organizations are possibly willing to
finance this kind of litigation is illustrated by the L&H case.161 One
consumer association, acting on behalf of its 4,000 members, did not charge
anything. The members pay an annual €150 contribution. They were not
charged an extra fee for the L&H case. The legal support in the case was
offered as a free service. The only condition the association imposed was
that their members had to retain their membership until the end of the
proceedings, which made it a perfect excuse to work at customer relations.
2. Financing By the Class Counsel
A second option to address the issue of class action funding is allowing
the class attorney to fund and finance the litigation on the basis of a
contingency fee agreement. The attorneys’ fees could either be paid by the
losing defendant (in countries that adopt a fee shifting rule) or by the
prevailing class (in countries that do not).162 Contingency fees are strictly
prohibited in Belgium because they violate public order and are incompatible
with attorneys’ professional ethics.163 However, intermediate forms of
contingency fee arrangements are possible. An agreement, by which the
attorneys’ fees partially depend on the outcome of the case, is allowed.164

161

See supra Part II.A and the empirical case study of the L&H case, supra note 82.
See UGO A. MATTEI, TEEMU RUSKOLA & ANTONIO GIDI, SCHLESINGER’S COMPARATIVE
LAW: CASES, TEXT, MATERIALS 691–95 (7th ed. 2009).
163
CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 446ter (Belg.) (forbidding a fee
arrangement linked to the outcome of the dispute); see also Michael Faure, Fokke Fernhout &
Niels Phillipsen, No Cure, No Pay, and Contingency Fees, in NEW TRENDS IN FINANCING
CIVIL LITIGATION IN EUROPE: A LEGAL EMPIRICAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 33, 42 (Mark
Tuil & Louis Visscher eds., 2010) (discussing contingent fees in Belgium). For a general
overview of litigation costs in Belgium see Vincent Sagaert & Ilse Samoy, Belgian, in THE
COSTS AND FUNDING OF CIVIL LITIGATION: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE 217–38 (Christopher
Hodges et al. eds., 2010). See also COUNSEL OF BARS AND LAW SOCIETIES OF EUROPE, CODE
OF CONDUCT FOR EUROPEAN LAWYERS, art. 3.3 (2006), available at http://www.oa.pt/upl/%7B
2f103317-16f3-4f86-9f8e-6d93d82312d9%7D.pdf.
A lawyer shall not be entitled to make a pactum de quota litis. By “pactum
de quota litis” is meant an agreement between a lawyer and the client entered
into prior to final conclusion of a matter to which the client is a party, by
virtue of which the client undertakes to pay the lawyer a share of the result
regardless of whether this is represented by a sum of money or by any other
benefit achieved by the client upon the conclusion of the matter. “Pactum de
quota litis” does not include an agreement that fees be charged in proportion
to the value of a matter handled by the lawyer if this is in accordance with an
officially approved fee scale or under the control of the Competent Authority
having jurisdiction over the lawyer.
Id.
164
Faure, Fernhout & Phillipsen, supra note 163, at 42.
162
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This comes down to a permissible enhancement of the attorneys’ fees based
on success in the litigation.
The fundamental problem with contingency fees and success fees in a
class action context is that the class attorney acquires a personal interest in
the outcome of the case, which is a breeding ground for conflicts of interest
between the class and its attorney. The class members are absent in the class
procedure, but bound by its outcome.165 Therefore, the adequacy of the class
attorney and the class representative is vital. The class members are forced
to almost blindly rely on the way the class attorney administers, deals, and
settles the case. The class attorney must also serve as a gatekeeper for the
defendant, who has to be protected against frivolous claims and blackmail
settlements. In other words, the class attorney serves a semi-public role.166
A personal financial interest in the case can hinder, and even impede, this
task.
3. Financing By a Third Party
Finally, third parties can finance and fund class action litigation. This is
possible through legal expenses insurance,167 such as before-the-eventinsurance,168 legal aid,169 a government fund,170 or more recently, third party
165

Issacharoff & Miller, supra note 136, at 206.
VOET, supra note 3, at 141–42, 222–23.
167
In this context, one has to refer to the Eschig decision of the European Court of Justice in
which the Court ruled that Article 4(1)(a) of Council Directive 87/344 on the coordination of
laws, regulations and administrative provisions relating to legal expenses insurance must be
interpreted as not permitting the legal expenses insurer to reserve the right to select the legal
representative of all the insured persons concerned, where a large number of insured persons
suffer loss as a result of the same event. Case C-199/08, Eschig v. UNIQA Sachversicherung,
AG, 2009 E.C.R. I-08295; see also Jason Rowley, Eschig v UNIQA Sachversicherung AG (C199/08): Legal Expenses Insurance – Legal Expenses Insurance Regulations 1990, 1 J. PERS.
INJ. LAW C32 (2010) (detailing the Eschig case).
168
Before-the-event-insurance (BTE) is taken out by those wishing to protect themselves
against potential litigation costs that could be incurred following a usually hypothetical future
event. BTE insurance is generally paid on an annual basis to an insurance company. Afterthe-event-insurance (ATE) is taken out after an event to insure the policyholder for
disbursements, as well as any costs should they lose their case. See Marco de Morpurgo, A
Comparative Legal and Economic Approach to Third-Party Litigation Funding, 19 CARDOZO
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 343, 353 (2011); Francis Regan, The Swedish Legal Services Policy
Remix: The Shift From Public Legal Aid to Private Legal Expense Insurance, 30 J.L. & SOC’Y
49, 50 n.4 (describing the two basic forms of legal expenses insurance: before-the-event and
after-the-event).
169
See, e.g., HODGES, supra note 10, at 177–202 (discussing public funding for class action
litigation in England and Wales).
170
See MULHERON, supra note 10, at 454–59 (describing the special public fund in Australia
and Ontario’s Class Proceedings Fund). The best example can be found in Québec with the
Fonds d’aide aux recours collectifs. More detailed information is available at http://www.
farc.justice.gouv.qc.ca/.
166
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funding.171 If class actions are to be introduced in Belgium, it is highly
uncertain the Belgian government would provide funds for legal aid or a
government fund. If it is willing however, this financial intervention by the
government will work better with an ideological plaintiff than with a class
member as class representative. An ideological plaintiff does not pursue a
personal interest, but the collective interests of the group. For a government
fund or a third party funder, this can be a decisive and legitimizing factor in
deciding whether to intervene. The fund’s intervention will have a public,
and therefore more acceptable, dimension. Moreover, because of their
experience and expertise with existing statutory collective actions,
associations and governmental bodies have become serious interlocutors.172
Compared to individual class members, they will be in a much better position
to monitor and criticize third party funders in a way that will benefit all class
members.
Funding and financing of class actions by ideological plaintiffs or third
parties are not ideal solutions. The icing on the cake could be one-way cost
shifting:173 when the ideological plaintiff wins the procedure, the losing
defendant has to pay the plaintiff’s attorneys’ fees and costs. In case of a
government fund, these costs could flow to this fund to finance future class
action litigation.174 If the defendant wins the procedure, the ideological
plaintiff is exempted from paying attorneys’ fees and costs. This
dispensation could be justified by the public interest in class actions as a
legal protection tool.
D. What Remedies Should Be Allowed?
Belgian statutory collective actions, as they are currently regulated, can
only be used to obtain injunctive or preventive relief. For example, the 1993
171
See, e.g., de Morpurgo, supra note 168, at 352; Deborah Hensler, The Future of Mass
Litigation: Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
306 (2011); Michael Legg & Louisa Travers, Necessity Is the Mother of Invention: The
Adoption of Third-Party Litigation Funding and the Closed Class in Australian Class Actions,
38 COMMON L. WORLD REV. 245 (2009); Rachael Mulheron & Peter Cashman, Third Party
Funding: A Changing Landscape, 27 CIV. JUST. Q. 312 (2008) (providing summaries and
examples of third party funding). It is important to underline that third party funders, who
take the risk of funding the litigation, work on a contingency fee basis. If the case is won or
settled, they receive a percentage (usually between 25% and 40%) of the compensation. If the
case is lost, they do not get anything.
172
Lafond, supra note 123, at 337–39 (considering associations as repeat players); VOET,
supra note 3, at 151.
173
See e.g., Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Shift Happens: Pressure on Foreign Attorney-Fee
Paradigms from Class Actions, 13 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 125 (2003) (discussing cost
shifting in a class action context).
174
For example, in Québec, the winning class has to turn the legal costs paid by the losing
defendant over to the Fonds d’aide aux recours collectifs. See supra note 170.
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Act on the Collective Action for the Protection of the Environment gives
standing to non-profit organizations to bring an action to stop acts that
violate environmental regulations.175 The non-discrimination acts give
standing to anti-discrimination associations to initiate an action to stop any
discriminatory behavior.176 In neither example is it possible to claim
damages on behalf of the harmed victims. If class members want
compensation, they have to initiate individual proceedings.
The three Belgian class action proposals all allow claims for monetary
relief as well. In that sense, they enhance access to justice. The government
proposal contains a remarkable provision. The class settlement or court
decision can stipulate that amounts under a certain threshold will not be
distributed amongst the class members, due to high distribution costs
compared to the amount each class member is entitled to receive.177 This cyprès-like technique178 is particularly important in small claims class actions.
The proposal suggests depositing the non-distributed money in a government
fund to finance future class actions. This idea should be applauded because
it allows taking away the illegal profit from the offender and using the
money efficiently to finance other class actions. Another useful and efficient
tool can be found in the proposal of the Flemish Bar Council. The proposal
contains a provision that allows the judge to appoint a special master
(judicial claim settler)179 to deal with the individual claims of class members
out of court.180
E. What Role Should the Court Play?
1. Which Court?
A preliminary question that arises concerning judicial involvement in
future Belgian class actions is: which court(s) should have jurisdiction?
175

See supra note 60.
See supra notes 61–64.
177
See Government Proposal, supra note 88, art. 44 (describing the stipulation against
distribution of monetary awards to class members).
178
See RACHAEL MULHERON, THE MODERN CY-PRÈS DOCTRINE: APPLICATIONS &
IMPLICATIONS (2006); Martin H. Redish, Peter Julian & Samantha Zyontz, Cy Près Relief and
the Pathologies of the Modern Class Action: A Normative and Empirical Analysis, 62 FLA. L.
REV. 617 (2010); Frances Howell Rudko, The Cy Près Doctrine in the United States: From
Extreme Reluctance to Affirmative Action, 46 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 471 (1998) (summarizing the
cy-près doctrine).
179
For more on the use of special masters in class actions see David Rosenberg, Of End
Games and Openings in Mass Tort Cases: Lessons from a Special Master, 69 B.U. L. REV.
695 (1989) and Wayne D. Brazil, Special Masters in Complex Cases: Extending the Judiciary
or Reshaping Adjudication?, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 394 (1986).
180
Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 90, art. 1385-5.
176
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According to the government proposal, the Brussels Court of First Instance
and the Brussels Court of Appeal will have exclusive jurisdiction to deal
with all Belgian class actions and class action settlements.181 The
government proposal partially copies the Dutch Collective Settlements Acts,
which makes the Amsterdam Court of Appeal exclusively competent to
approve all class action settlements.182
This will lead to a specialized and experienced class action court,183 and
will pave the way for an efficient resolution of class actions. A uniform and
predictable jurisprudence will develop in a specialized area of the law (e.g.,
class action prerequisites and notice methods). Moreover, a specialized and
more experienced court will be able to deal with these cases more efficiently
and swiftly.184 Because the total number of mass cases in European
countries seems to be fairly limited, even in jurisdictions that already have
class actions or class action-like tools,185 it would be inefficient to give
jurisdiction to multiple courts. One competent court also avoids timeconsuming litigation over jurisdictional issues and forum shopping.
Critics argue that an exclusive, competent court can be very powerful and
hinder the development of law. It can also be perceived by class members as
isolated, far, and inaccessible, which can lead to opt-outs because victims
want to enforce their rights in a closer jurisdiction. These dangers can be
curtailed by a number of safeguards. First, class action cases can be
allocated, in first instance and in appeal, to a three-judge panel. This allows
discussion,186 and leaves room for development of the law. Second, these
class action judges must be trained. Judicial education is essential.
Judges need to be told that damage class actions are not just
about problem solving, that the rights of plaintiffs and

181
See Projet de loi relative aux aspects judiciares des procédures de réparation collective
[Proposal Relating to the Procedural Aspects of Collective Procedures], available at http://econo
mie.fgov.be/fr/binaries/Class%20actions_Loi_modifiant_le_Code_judiciaire_avec_appe_tcm32
6-77473.pdf.
182
BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [Dutch Civil Code] art. 1013.3 (Neth.).
183
See Stephen J. Choi, The Evidence on Securities Class Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1465,
1517–18 (2004) (“Specialized judges may develop expertise in distinguishing between
frivolous and meritorious claims and therefore become more willing to sanction frivolous
suits.”). This is also in the best interests of defendants.
184
See id. (“Litigants faced with the same set of repeat judges may also obtain a higher
degree of predictability of judicial outcomes, leading to a greater probability of settlement.”).
185
To date, there have been seventy-five GLO procedures in England and Wales. Since the
introduction in 2005 of the Dutch Collective Settlements Acts, there have been six cases. See
cases cited supra note 17. In Sweden, there were eleven class action procedures between
2003 and 2007.
186
VOET, supra note 3, at 310 (and references in nt. 1541). Belgian law does not have
dissenting opinions.
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defendants are at stake, that responsibility for their outcomes
lies not just with the class counsel and defendant but with the
judge as well, and that what is deemed acceptable in one case
sends important signals about what will be accepted in
another.187
This training can be organized on a national and international level. A
coordinating role can be reserved for the European Judicial Training
Network that was established in 2000. It is the most important European
platform concerning the training of judges and the exchange of judicial
knowledge and experience. The goal of the Network is “to foster a common
legal and judicial European culture. [It] develops training standards and
curricula, coordinates judicial training exchanges and programmes,
disseminates training expertise and promotes cooperation between EU
judicial training institutions.”188
Finally, the exclusive class action court can be made mobile and become
a traveling class action court.189 However, this is practicable only in small
countries, such as Belgium,190 Switzerland, or the Netherlands. It would be
less convenient in larger European countries, such as France, Spain, Italy, or
Germany.
2. Active Role of the Class Action Judge
In this context, the adversarial character of Belgian civil procedure is
relevant.191 The autonomous role of the parties in starting and ending a civil
case on the one hand, and the active role of the judge on the other, are two
important facets of this principle. The parties autonomously set the limits of
the dispute brought before the court.192 First, this implies that the plaintiff
187
DEBORAH R. HENSLER ET AL., CLASS ACTION DILEMMAS: PURSUING PUBLIC GOALS FOR
PRIVATE GAIN 497–98 (2000) (emphasis in original).
188
EUROPEAN JUDICIAL TRAINING NETWORK, http://www.ejtn.net/About/About-EJTN/.
189
For more on judge mobility see Randall D. Lloyd, Leonard B. Weinberg & Elizabeth
Francis, An Exploration of State and Local Judge Mobility, 22 JUST. SYS. J. 19 (2001) and
George Pring & Catherine Pring, Specialized Environmental Courts and Tribunals at the
Confluence of Human Rights and the Environment, 11 OR. REV. INT’L L. 301, 328 (2009)
(suggesting the creation of traveling courts and judges to realize access to environmental
justice).
190
Belgium covers an area of 30,528 Km2 (11,787 mi2), and it has a population of about
10.4 million people. Cent. Intelligence Agency, CIA World Fact Book: Belgium, Mar. 15,
2013, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/be.html.
191
See Jean Laenens & George Van Mellaert, The Judicial System and Procedure, in
INTRODUCTION TO BELGIAN LAW 83 (Hubert Bocken ed., 2001); Taelman & Voet, supra note
30, at 309–11 (describing Belgium’s adversarial judicial system).
192
Paul Lefebvre, Belgium, in INTERNATIONAL CIVIL PROCEDURE 76 (Shelby R. Grubbs ed.,
2003).
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delimits the object of the proceedings. The judge is limited, but at the same
time obliged, to decide the case as determined by the plaintiff. Furthermore,
a judge is not allowed to involve parties in the proceedings other than those
designated by the plaintiff. This is important.193 When the judge ascertains
that there are victims similarly situated to the plaintiff, he or she cannot
instruct their intervention.
Another feature is the active role of the judge.194 Once the parties have
delineated the contours of the proceedings, the judge plays an active role
with respect to the orderly evolution of the proceedings. This means that the
procedural rules should be respected and that a judgment should be rendered
within a reasonable time. Second, in case parties do not succeed in
producing sufficient evidence, the judge is obliged to order a complementary
inquiry consisting of, for example, the submission of certain documents,
witness testimony, an official visit to the scene of the facts, and the personal
appearance of the parties in the court. There is no discovery in Belgian
law.195 The judge is the key figure in the gathering of evidence.
As his common-law counterpart, the civil-law judge is becoming more
and more like a case manager. This is an encouraging development because:
the procedural treatment of a case should not be driven by the
parties’ strategies, but should be taken in hand and controlled
by the court. It is the court that bears responsibility for the
swift and efficient administration of justice, and therefore has
to steer to case through the procedure . . . . The term [case
management] suggests a new understanding of the judge’s role
in civil litigation, his mission being not only to decide the case
as the parties present it to him, but also to manage the caseload
that confronts his court in a way that every procedure is dealt
with in the most efficient manner. It is clear that this implies a
significant increase in the judge’s powers.196
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See supra Part I.B.2.
Lefebvre, supra note 192, at 76, 85; Paul Van Orshoven, Powers of the Judge: Belgium,
in EUROPEAN TRADITIONS IN CIVIL PROCEDURE 291, 292 (2005).
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Lefebvre, supra note 192, at 84 (“Belgian law does not contemplate preliminary
disclosures, expert disclosures or pretrial disclosures, or written questions addressed by one
party to the other. At the most, a party can, in its written submissions, direct questions
challenging the other party openly to respond, attempting by so doing to steer the debate and
influence the court. Lastly, Belgian law does not contemplate depositions for discovery.”).
196
Benoît Allemeersch, Civil Case Management: The Belgian Debate and Reforms, in THE
XIIITH WORLD CONGRESS OF PROCEDURAL LAW: THE BELGIAN AND DUTCH REPORTS 237
(A.W. Jongbloed ed., 2008).
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Even more than in one-on-one litigation, class actions need judges as real
case managers, for the simple reason that they have a public role in
protecting the interests of absent class members and defendants.197
Especially in the U.S., where class actions are still largely lawyer-driven,
the judge plays a crucial and supervisory role in the relationship between the
class and the class attorney.198 If the judge, acting as an active case manager,
can safeguard the interests of class members and defendants, he or she can
create public confidence in the proper use of class actions.
3. Keeping the Litigation Moving Forward
A class action judge has two vital roles in class action law. On the one
hand, he or she is responsible for keeping the litigation moving forward. To
be able to act as case manager, the judge needs a range of management tools.
The Belgian procedural tools that are used in individual litigation can be
utilized in active management and steering of class actions: the possibility of
imposing a binding procedural calendar,199 the possibility of undertaking a
complementary inquiry sua sponte, the opportunity of having an interactive
debate with the parties,200 and the possibility of imposing a fine in case of
misuse or abuse of procedure.201 When class actions are introduced in
Belgium, the utility of those management tools will have to be verified.
Possibly, they will have to be adapted to be properly used in a class action
context. On the other hand, and this is vital, the Belgian class action judge
will also need new customized tools, like his common-law counterpart.
[T]he Court has been vested with the power to order the
discontinuance of a class proceeding, to substitute a
representative plaintiff who is not adequately representing the
interests of the class members, and to establish . . . a sub-group
and appoint a person to be the sub-group representative party
197

Catherine Piché, Judging Fairness in Class Action Settlements, 28 WINDSOR Y.B.
ACCESS JUST. 111, 111–12 (2010) (“Judges involved in class action cases have a tremendous
responsibility toward class members and toward the public in general. They are asked to
adjudicate the rights of numerous plaintiffs; importantly, the rights of absent or unnamed ones,
according to their presumed interests.”).
198
Samuel Issacharoff, Class Action Conflicts, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 805 (1997); Richard
A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 747 (2002).
199
CODE JUDICIAIRE [C.JUD.] [Belgian Judicial Code] art. 747, § 2 (Belg.).
200
Id. art. 756ter.
201
Id. art. 780bis; see also Piet Taelman, Abuse of Procedural Rights: Regional Report for
Belgium – The Netherlands, in ABUSE OF PROCEDURAL RIGHT: COMPARATIVE STANDARDS OF
PROCEDURAL FAIRNESS 125–49 (Michele Taruffo ed., 1998) (discussing the abuse of
procedural rights in Belgium).
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on behalf of the sub-group members. The Court needs to give
its approval before a class action can be settled or
discontinued . . . . Further examples of the interventionist role
which the Federal Court is expected to assume are provided by
[law] which allows [additional notice] . . . . But perhaps the
most important provision . . . empowers the Federal Court to
make “any order . . . [it] thinks appropriate or necessary to
ensure that justice is done in the proceedings.”202
The three Belgian class action proposals disregard the utility of existing
management tools. They all start from the rather naïve idea that the existing
management tools can simply be transposed in a class action context. This is
not the case. Moreover, the proposals overlook specific class action
management tools. None pay attention to the possibility of additional notice,
imposing additional conditions on the class representative or class attorney,
or allowing individual class members to be involved in the procedure. Only
the government proposal contains a poorly formulated sub-classing
provision.203 The possibility of limiting or expanding the scope of the class
can only be found in the proposal of the Green opposition parties.204
4. Approving Class Action Settlements
On the other hand, the class action judge is responsible for evaluating and
approving any class action settlement. This is the case in the U.S., 205 and the
Dutch Collective Settlements Act.206 The Amsterdam Court of Appeal does
not approve the settlement pro forma. The Court can refuse approval if: (a)
the agreement does not comply with the legal provisions;207

202
Morabito, supra note 111, at 494–95; see also MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
(FOURTH) § 21 (2004).
203
See Government Proposal, supra note 88, art. 12 (providing for sub-classes in cases of
mass loss).
204
Re-Submitted Opposition Proposal, supra note 101, art. 1237/5, §§ 2, 3.
205
FED. R. CIV. P. 23(e).
206
See supra Part I.A.
207
BURGERLIJK WETBOEK [BW] [Dutch Civil Code] art. 7:907.2 (Neth.) (“The agreement
must in any case include: (a) a description of the group or groups of persons on whose behalf
the agreement was concluded, according to the nature and the seriousness of their loss; (b) the
most accurate indication possible of the number of persons belonging to the group or groups;
(c) the compensation that will be awarded to these persons; (d) the conditions which these
persons must meet to qualify for the compensation; (e) the procedure by which the
compensation will be established and can be obtained; [and] (f) the name and domicile of the
person to whom the written notification . . . can be sent.”).
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(b) the amount of the compensation awarded is not reasonable
having regard, inter alia, to the extent of the damage, the ease
and speed with which the compensation can be obtained and
the possible causes of the damage; (c) insufficient security is
provided for the payment of the debt-claims of persons on
whose behalf the agreement was concluded; (d) the agreement
does not provide for the independent assessment of the
compensation to be paid pursuant to the agreement; (e) the
interests of the persons on whose behalf the agreement was
concluded are otherwise not adequately safeguarded; (f) the
foundation or association [that concluded the settlement] is not
sufficiently representative with regard to the interests of
persons on whose behalf the agreement was concluded; (g) the
group of persons on whose behalf the agreement was
concluded is not large enough to justify a declaration by the
court that the agreement is binding; [and] (h) there is a legal
person who will provide the compensation pursuant to the
agreement and he is not a party to the agreement.208
If one or more of these conditions are not met, the judge can ask the parties
to complete or alter the settlement.209 The Court can also appoint an expert
to give an advice on the settlement.210 In the pending proposal to amend the
Dutch Collective Settlements Act, the Dutch legislature wants to expand the
role of the court. The idea is to allow parties, before any approval procedure
is launched, to summon the other party before the court when no settlement
can be reached, in which case the court can act as a settlement facilitator.211
The three Belgian class action proposals also pay attention to the role of
the class action judge in approving a class action settlement. In the proposal
of the Green opposition parties, this role overlaps with the role the judge
plays today in individual litigation. He or she blindly approves the
settlement, without the possibility of assessing the content of the settlement.
Only when rules of public order are violated (e.g., a settlement in a custody

208

Id. art. 7:907.3.
Id. art. 7:907.4.
210
WETBOEK VAN BURGERLIJKE RECHTSVORDERING [Rv] [Dutch Judicial Code] art. 1016
(Neth.).
211
Staten-Generaal, Wijziging van het Burgerlijk Wetboek, het Wetboek van Burgerlijke
Rechtsvordering en de Faillissementswet teneinde de collectieve afwikkeling van
massavorderingen verder te vergemakkelijken [Act Amending the Act on Collective
Settlement of Mass Damage] Dec. 22, 2011, available at https://zoek.officielebekendmaking
en.nl/dossier/33126/kst-33126-2?resultIndex=19&sorttype=1&sortorder=4. The proposal also
suggests making the Dutch Collective Settlements Act applicable in bankruptcy cases.
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case), can the judge refuse approval.212 The two other class action proposals
are similar to the Dutch Collective Settlements Act. The judge, who plays a
more active role, can refuse approval if certain conditions are not met,
although the standards are not as high as in the Netherlands.213 According to
the proposal of the Flemish Bar Council, the court only has to verify that the
settlement is not clearly unreasonable for the victims.214 Nevertheless, this
more active role should be applauded because of the public role class action
judges play in protecting the interests of absent class members and
defendants.215
IV. CONCLUSION
The three class action proposals seem to indicate that on the political
level, and within the bar, there is a consensus on the need for class actions in
Belgium. The question arises whether this is really the case. Before
answering that question, it is vital to distance oneself from the procedural
issue. Before proper procedures can be determined, the economic, social,
and political course to deal with mass cases must be set out. Looking at
foreign examples, most legislators first thoroughly reflect on the broader
context in which they want to embed a possible collective procedure.
Commissions, working groups, think tanks, and the like are set up to conduct
that reflection, to map all possibilities, and to list the desirable and
undesirable consequences of all options.216 Only when a policy consensus is
reached by all relevant actors, can the procedural issue be addressed.
Although a working group was set up and the 2009 government proposal
was written under its auspices, this reflection exercise was insufficient. For
example, it is regrettable that nothing was done with the preliminary
questionnaire, not a single report or study was drafted, and there was no
scientific and broad debate including all relevant actors. Instead, a tentative
proposal was made public. The same conclusion can be drawn with respect
to the proposals of the opposition parties and the Flemish Bar Council.
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See Government Proposal, supra note 88; Flemish Bar Council Proposal, supra note 90.
214
See supra Part II.D.
215
See supra Part III.E.2.
216
In Denmark, there was Recommendation No 1468/2005 of the Permanent Committee for
Civil Procedure (Retsplejerådet). Werlauff, supra note 7, at 203, n.8. In Finland, three
preliminary commission reports were published before an act was written. Arto Lindfors &
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aw.com/pdf/classactions.pdf. In Sweden, the Commission for Collective Actions issued an
elaborate report in 1995; and in Canada, the Ontario Law Reform Commission published three
volumes of research on class actions in 1982. ONTARIO LAW REFORM COMMISSION, supra
note 122.
213

GEORGIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL AND COMPARATIVE LAW (DO NOT DELETE)

478

GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L.

8/28/2013 9:56 AM

[Vol. 41:433

Except for the traditional general observations, a thorough reflection on the
broader policy is lacking.
This course of events is symptomatic of Belgian civil procedure and
Belgian politics overall. Unfortunately, the most interesting discussions on
civil procedural topics, and the broader policy in which they are embedded,
always take place after new, and usually impulsive, legislation becomes
effective, as was illustrated in 2007 when three major procedural reforms
were enacted.217 The fact that five years later, two out of three acts have
been “repaired,”218 is revealing.
In addition, a holistic approach is required to tackle mass harms. It is
unwise to put all the eggs in the private litigation basket. As already
mentioned by Cappelletti,219 optimal collective redress can only be achieved
by a matrix of intertwined models.220 Especially with respect to small
claims, the potential for other redress mechanisms and models has to be
underlined. Moreover, priority has to be given to an alternative dispute
resolution (ADR) model that encompasses direct negotiation, conciliation,
and arbitration by ADR agencies.221 In addition, the significance of
regulation and possible regulatory oversight of collective restitution and

217

Loi relative à la répétibilité des honoraires et des frais d'avocat [Act on Attorneys’ Fees]
of Apr. 21, 2007, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], May 31, 2007, 2d
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New Procedural Rules] of Apr. 26, 2007, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of
Belgium], June 12, 2007, 31626; Loi modifiant le Code judiciaire en ce qui concerne
l’expertise et rétablissant l’article quater du Code pénal [Act on Reforming Rules on Expert
Witnesses] of May 15, 2007, MONITEUR BELGE [M.B.] [Official Gazette of Belgium], Aug.
22, 2007, 43898.
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370 (2010); CHRISTOPHER HODGES, THE REFORM OF CLASS AND REPRESENTATIVE ACTIONS IN
EUROPEAN LEGAL SYSTEMS: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR COLLECTIVE REDRESS IN EUROPE 235
(2008) (suggesting a ranking of the different options: first voluntary settlement; then
regulatory oversight; and finally judicial supervision, which includes private enforcement
tools as class actions). Also, in the U.S. some authors note there are public legal protection
tools as valuable alternatives for class actions, especially in small claims cases. See, e.g.,
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restoration222 cannot be underestimated, especially in Europe. Nevertheless,
and to complete this set of collective redress mechanisms, the private
litigation model should include a class action device.
In that sense, possible Belgian class actions should be viewed as
additional legal protection tools. From a procedural point of view, this will
emerge in the superiority inquiry.223 Contrary to the U.S. counterpart, a
European, and specifically a Belgian, civil-law judge will more easily accept
the existence of other available methods for adjudicating the controversy,
such as ADR and regulatory mechanisms. Unlike the U.S., priority must be
given to these alternatives, particularly with respect to small claims.
Shaping class actions as additional legal protection tools comes down to a
continuous quest for safeguards to level the playing field and correct the
procedural imbalance inherent in group conflicts. On one hand, the absent
class members have to rely on the class representative to enforce their rights.
On the other hand, the defendant has to be protected against the power of the
group. Belgian class actions will be shaped differently than U.S.-style class
actions because they will be embedded in a different procedural culture with
different rules on standing, funding and financing litigation, and court
involvement.224 Contrary to U.S.-style class actions, Belgian class actions
must be initiated by an ideological plaintiff, cannot be funded on a
contingency or success fee basis, and must be dealt with by one competent
court. Nevertheless, Belgian class actions will achieve the same objectives
as U.S.-style class actions and will offer claims for injunctive and monetary
relief.
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